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MARTIN Z.P. OLSZYNSKI *
The Canadian Environmental Enforcement Act [EEA] directs judges to consider actual envi-
ronmental damage, or risk thereof, when setting fi nes for environmental offences. The EEA 
defi nes damage as including the loss of use and non-use values. While these terms are not 
unprecedented in Canadian environmental law, their use in environmental damage assessment 
is. Bearing in mind recent developments in environmental valuation in the United States 
and internationally, and considering the emergence of the “ecosystem services” paradigm 
in particular, this article explores the opportunities and challenges for ecosystem services-
based environmental damages assessment in the Canadian environmental sentencing context. 
The ecosystem services concept, much written about in American legal literature, provides 
a framework for identifying and organizing the numerous direct and indirect contributions 
that ecosystems make to human well-being, the value of which can then be expressed in 
economic terms. Although novel and ambitious in some respects, this approach would be 
consistent with both Parliament’s intention in passing the EEA and with the pre-existing 
common law framework for environmental sentencing in Canada.
Le Parlement canadien a récemment adopté la Loi sur le contrôle d’application de lois envi-
ronnementales [LCALE], qui ordonne aux juges de considérer les dommages environnementaux 
réels, ou le risque de ces derniers, lors de la détermination des amendes relatives à des 
infractions environnementales. La LCALE défi nit expressément les dommages comme incluant 
la valeur de la perte de jouissance et de non usage et, bien que ces termes ne soient pas 
sans précédent dans le droit de l’environnement canadien, leur évaluation actuelle l’est. En 
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ON 18 JUNE 2009, Canada’s Parliament passed the government-sponsored 
Environmental Enforcement Act [EEA].1 Th is “sweeping”2 and lengthy omnibus 
legislation contained numerous amendments to the enforcement, off ence, penalty, 
and sentencing provisions of nine diff erent federal environmental statutes, 
including Canada’s fl agship environmental protection legislation, the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act, 1999.3 It establishes new minimum and higher 
maximum fi nes, requires fi nes to be doubled for second and subsequent off ences, 
and directs all fi nes to be paid to a specifi ed government account, the Environ-
mental Damages Fund (EDF). It also requires courts to add any profi ts gained 
1. SC 2009, c 14 [EEA]. Th e EEA received royal assent on 18 June 2009.
2. House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 2d Sess, No 31 (23 March 2009) at 1823 (Mark 
Warawa) [House of Commons Debates]; and House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 2d Sess, No 
31 (23 March 2009) at 1826) (David McGuinty).
3. SC 1999, c 33 [CEPA, 1999]. Th e full list of amended statues can be found in Part II B, 
below. 
gardant à l’esprit les récents développements de l’évaluation environnementale aux États-
Unis et sur la scène internationale, et en considérant en particulier l’émergence du modèle 
des « services écosystémiques », cet article se penche sur les occasions et les défi s de 
l’évaluation des dommages environnementaux axée sur les services écosystémiques dans 
le contexte de la détermination des peines environnementales au Canada. Le concept des 
services écosystémiques, très présent dans la documentation juridique américaine, fournit 
un cadre pour l’identifi cation et l’organisation des nombreux apports directs et indirects que 
les écosystèmes procurent pour le bien-être des humains; la valeur de ces apports peut alors 
s’exprimer en termes économiques. Bien que cette approche soit novatrice et ambitieuse à 
certains égards, elle serait conforme à l’intention du Parlement lors de son adoption de la 
LCALE et au cadre préexistant de la common law relativement aux peines environnementales 
au Canada.
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in the commission of an off ence to the amount of fi nes ordered, and requires 
corporations to disclose details of any convictions to their shareholders.4 
Of all these amendments, the changes to the sentencing provisions have 
the most potential to transform not only environmental sentencing, but also 
Canadian environmental law generally. When all of the EEA’s provisions are 
implemented, judges setting fi nes for an off ence under any of the nine statutes 
will be required to consider whether, in the commission of that off ence, the 
accused “caused damage or risk of damage” to some aspect of the environment.5 
Damage is defi ned as including “the loss of use value and non-use value.”6
Admittedly, there is nothing ground-breaking about judges taking into 
account the actual and potential environmental harm caused by an off ender 
in determining the appropriate fi ne; these have long been relevant, if inexact, 
considerations in Canadian environmental sentencing law.7 Nor are the terms 
“use-value” and “non-use value” unprecedented in Canada. Th e Ontario Law 
Reform Commission fi rst advocated their potential role in civil liability for en-
vironmental damages in 1990.8 More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada 
opened the door for governments to sue for loss of such values in Canadian Forest 
Products v British Columbia (Canfor).9 In that case, the defendant company was 
found liable for negligently failing to extinguish a control burn. Th e provincial 
Crown sought both commercial damages (for lost stumpage revenue) and com-
pensation for environmental damages, identifying three components of such loss: 
“Use value” includes the services provided by the ecosystem to human beings, 
including food sources, water quality and recreational opportunities.
4. Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Legislative Summary: Bill C-16: 
Environmental Enforcement Act by Penny Becklumb (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 
2009) [Parliamentary Information and Research Service]. See also Environment Canada, 
Backgrounder: Overview of the Environmental Enforcement Bill (3 March 2009), online: 
Environment Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca> [Backgrounder]. 
5. See e.g. Migratory Birds Convention Act, SC 1994, c 22, s 13.1 (2)(b) & s 13.1(4) [MBCA] 
(as amended by the Environmental Enforcement Act, not yet proclaimed into force). See supra 
note 1. 
6. Ibid.
7.  R v United Keno Hill Mines Ltd, [1980] 1 YJ 299 at para 13, 5 WCB 467 [United Keno Hill]. 
Th is case and others are further discussed in Part II, below. 
8. Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Damages for Environmental Harm (Toronto: 
Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1990) [OLRC Report].
9. 2004 SCC 38, 2 SCR 74 [Canfor]. See Jerry V DeMarco, Marcia Valiante & Marie-Anne 
Bowden, “Opening the Door for Common Law Environmental Protection in Canada: Th e 
Decision in British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd.” (2005) 15:2 J Envtl L & Prac 233.
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“Passive use” or “existence” [non-use] value recognizes that a member of the public 
may be prepared to pay something for the protection of a natural resource, even if he 
or she never directly uses it … . 
Finally, an ecosystem may be said to have an “inherent value” beyond its usefulness 
to humans. … [T]o the extent humans recognize this inherent value, and are willing 
to forego income or wealth for it, it becomes a part of passive [non] use value and 
becomes compensable.10
In Canfor, however, British Columbia failed to adduce any evidence of 
loss of these values. Th us, while recognizing that “our environment is an 
asset of superordinate importance”11 and leaving it open to both the federal and 
provincial Crown to prove environmental harm in a future case, the Court 
dismissed this part of the claim, considering it “neither appropriate nor necessary 
to pronounce on the specifi c methodology that could be employed in valuation 
of environmental losses.”12 
At the time, Canfor was described as the latest in a series of cases “to chart 
a positive future for environmental law in Canada.”13 In the years since its 
release, however, little progress appears to have been made. Th e case has been 
cited numerous times by various courts, but no government litigant has taken up 
the task of environmental valuation for the purposes of environmental damages 
assessment.14 What commentators described as “a signifi cant step”15 and a “poten-
tial … watershed”16 has thus far been a mere trickle, barely meeting the Court’s 
own assessment of an “incremental” development in the common law.17 As a 
result, many environmental harms continue to be externalized.18
10. Canfor, supra note 9 at para 138.
11. Ibid at para 135.
12. Ibid at para 153.
13. DeMarco, Valiante & Bowden, supra note 9 at 233. 
14. Of the 26 times Canfor has been reported as being cited, only two cases have been concerned 
with environmental damages, and only in a limited way. See Bérubé c Savard, 2006 QCCQ 
2077 at paras 20-27, [2006] RDI 356; and Westside Transport Inc v Continental Insurance Co, 
2004 BCSC 1195 at para 56, 36 BCLR (4th) 387.
15. Stewart AG Elgie & Antasia M Lintner, “Th e Supreme Court’s Canfor Decision: Losing Th e 
Battle But Winning Th e War For Environmental Damages” (2005) 37:1 UBC L Rev 223 at 260.
16. DeMarco, Valiante & Bowden, supra note 9 at 255.
17. Canfor, supra note 9 at para 155.
18. See DeMarco, Valiante & Bowden, supra note 9 at 238. Th ey observe that, “[f ]or instance, 
a corporation that avails itself of tax incentives and inexpensive access to public resources … 
may be able to justify a particular development project from the perspective of its bottom-
line even if the net eff ect of the development on society may actually be negative. Economists 
often speak of interests that have been externalized from the decision in question.” See also 
Elgie & Lintner, supra note 15 at 229. 
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Th e inclusion of use and non-use values in the EEA presents an opportunity 
to pick up where Canfor left off , especially when one considers that there were 
over fi ve hundred convictions under the laws amended by the EEA in the fi ve 
years preceding its passage.19 While not all of these would have involved environ-
mental harm or even the risk thereof, several recent and high profi le incidents, 
such as the prosecution of Canadian oil sands company Syncrude after approxi-
mately 1,500 ducks died in one of its tailings ponds, suggest that the EEA could 
spur some activity on this front.20
Environmental valuation was traditionally an economist’s game.21 American 
lawyers and judges began to enter the fray following the 1980 passage of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, 
also known as Superfund).22 Ecologists started to get involved in valuation activity 
in the last two decades, and their work only began gaining wider acceptance at 
the time that Canfor was decided.23 Th ey began by analogizing ecosystem structure 
and function to capital, as understood in economics to be the stock that “gives 
rise to the fl ow of ecosystem goods and services.”24 Recognizing that society’s 
19. House of Commons Debates, supra note 2 at 1824 (Mark Warawa).
20. R v Syncrude Canada Ltd, 2010 ABPC 229, 53 CELR (3d) 196 [Syncrude]. Th e company 
was found guilty of depositing a substance harmful to migratory birds, contrary to subsection 
5.1(1) of the MBCA, 1995.  
21. Wiktor L Adamowicz, “What’s it worth? An examination of historical trends and future 
directions in environmental valuation” (2004) 48:3 Austl J of Agric Resource Econ 419. See 
also WM Hanemann, “Th e economic conception of water” in Peter P Rogers, M Ramón 
Llamas & Luis Martinez-Cortina, eds, Water Crisis: myth or reality? (London: Taylor & 
Francis, 2006) 61 at 67. 
22. 42 USC § 9601 (1980) [CERCLA]. Under CERCLA, natural resource damages are 
recoverable by federal and state governments, as well as Indian tribes, for damages caused 
by the release of hazardous substances. CERCLA is also known as Superfund because of 
the creation of a special fund for the immediate clean up of the most contaminated sites 
with provisions for cost-recovery later. Most of the American legal scholarship in this area 
has focused on the evidentiary suitability of various non-market valuation techniques, and 
especially contingent valuation (CV). See Damage Assessment Remediation and Restoration 
Program, Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation by Kenneth Arrow et al 
(Silver Spring: NOAA Offi  ce of Response & Restoration, 1993); Frank B Cross, “Restoring 
Restoration For Natural Resource Damages” (1993) 24:2 U Tol L Rev 319 at 321; Brian 
R Binger, Robert F Copple & Elizabeth Hoff man, “Th e Use Of Contingent Valuation 
Methdology In Natural Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction” 
(1995) 89:3 Nw UL Rev at 1030-31. 
23. Th e term “ecologists” is intended to include ecological economists and the fi eld of ecological 
economics.
24. JB Ruhl, Steven E Kraft & Christopher L Lant, Th e Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services 
(Washington: Island Press, 2007) at 17.
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near total ignorance of its dependence on these services represented a “major 
hindrance” to the formulation and implementation of eff ective environmental 
policy,25 this group then took it upon itself to not only assess the numerous 
services provided by nature but also to provide an estimate of their economic 
value. Th e fi rst study to do this on a global scale estimated the value of seventeen 
ecosystem services, such as gas and water regulation, at thirty-three trillion dollars 
(US) per year.26 And while the initial approaches were marked by a high degree 
of uncertainty,27 the ensuing “explosion of interest”28 has resulted in “tremendous 
advancements.”29 
Th is is not to suggest that ecosystem services theory has completely displaced 
conventional environmental economics, or that it is an environmental policy 
panacea.30 It is, however, the conceptual framework under which valuation (and 
environmental decision making generally) is increasingly being carried out: 
“From their origins as an obscure phrase just nine years ago, ‘ecosystem services’ 
have gone mainstream, with new initiatives … blossoming around the world,”31 
25. Gretchen Daily, ed, Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems (Washington: 
Island Press, 1997) at xv.  
26. Robert Costanza et al, “Th e value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital” 
(1997) 387 Nature 253 at 253. For comparison, the global GNP at this time was 
approximately eighteen trillion (US dollars) per year.
27. Costanza et al listed 12 sources of error and uncertainty in their study. See ibid at 258. 
While lauding the eff ort, their approach was also criticized by several economists. See e.g. 
David Pearce, “Auditing the Earth: Th e Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural 
Capital” (1998) 40:2 Environment 23 at 23-28. 
28. JB Ruhl & James Salzman, “Th e Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services” (2007) 
22:2 J Land Use & Envtl L 157 at 157.
29. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 24 at 9. Th e authors observe that “[t]remendous 
advancement has been made in the past decade towards improving our understanding of the 
ecological dynamics of ecosystem services, their geographic distribution across landscapes, 
and their economic value to human communities.” See also Kate A Brauman et al, “Th e 
Nature and Value of Ecosystem Services: An Overview Highlighting Hydrologic Services” 
(2007) 32 Ann Rev Envtl Res 67 at 68. 
30. Environmental valuation generally and ecosystem services specifi cally both have their fair 
share of detractors.  See e.g. Morgan M Roberton, “Th e neoliberalization of ecosystem 
services: wetland mitigation banking and the problem of measurement” in Nick Heynen 
et al, eds, Neoliberal Environments: False promises and unnatural consequences (Routledge: 
New York, 2007) at 114. Richard B Norgaard, “Ecosystem services: From eye-opening 
metaphor to complexity Blinder” (2010) 69:6 Ecological Econ 1219; Frank Ackerman & 
Lisa Heinzerling, “Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefi t Analysis of Environmental Protection” 
(2002) 150:5 U Pa L Rev 1553; Mark Sagoff , Th e Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and 
the Environment, 2d (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
31. James Salzman, “Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field” (2005) 
80:3 NYUL Rev 870 at 873.
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including in Australia, Costa Rica, and most recently in Norway and the United 
Kingdom.32 Of particular relevance to this article, the Science Advisory Board on 
Valuing the Protection of Ecological Systems and Services (EPA Science Advisory 
Board [EPA-SAB] created by the US Environmental Protection Agency in 2003) 
recently released a report suggesting inter alia that an ecosystem services approach 
“would enhance the ability … to assess injury, defi ne restoration goals, and 
calculate damages” under CERCLA.33 In fact, regulations under both that statute 
and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)34 have long relied on the ‘services’ provided by 
natural resources as their metric for damages,35 reference to which can be found 
in the United States’ recent complaint against BP Global and others following 
the August 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.36
Th e purpose of this article is to assess the potential for an ecosystem services 
approach to environmental damages assessment (EDA) in the post-EEA world. 
Part I begins with a primer on ecosystem services theory. While research into 
ecosystem services in Canada dates back to at least 2004,37 and the term has even 
32. See Alister Doyle, “Norway index gauges nature; may bring GDP rethink”, Reuters 
(21 October 2010) online: Reuters < http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/10/21/
idINIndia-52362320101021>. Doyle notes, “An index to judge the state of Norway’s 
nature is a world fi rst that may be a step towards valuing ‘free’ services such as insect 
pollination or forest growth in a radical shift in economics, offi  cials say.” Th e UK released 
the fi ndings of the UK National Ecosystem Assessment (UK NEA), which “represents a 
fi rst attempt to assess our stocks of natural ecosystem resources, their state and the trends 
in their development.” See UK National Ecosystem Assessment, Th e UK National Ecosystem 
Assessment: Synthesis of the Key Findings, UNEP-WCMC (Cambridge: 2011) at 4, online: 
<http://uknea.unep-wcmc.org/Resources/tabid/82/Default.asp>.
33. United States, United Stated Environmental Protection Agency, Valuing the Protection of 
Ecological Systems and Services: A Report of the EPA Science Advisory Board (Washington, DC: 
Science Advisory Board, 2009) at 95 [EPA]. See also Wayne R Munns Jr et al, “Translating 
Ecological Risk to Ecosystem Service Loss” (2009) 5:4 500 at 501. Other American 
initiatives include the creation of the Offi  ce of Environmental Markets (OEM), formerly 
the Offi  ce of Ecosystem Services and Markets, established under the US Department of 
Agriculture in December 2008. Th e change in name does not appear to have changed the 
Offi  ce’s mandate. See United States Department of Agriculture, News Release, No 0115.10 
(Washington, DC: Offi  ce of Communications, 10 March 2010). 
34. 33 USC § 2701 (1990) [OPA].
35. For the CERCLA, see 43 CFR § 11. For the OPA, see 15 CFR § 990 (2011). 
36. See United States of America v BP Exploration & Production Inc (Complaint) at para 66, 
online: <http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/Environmental%20Law/
USDOJ%20BP%20Complaint.pdf >. (Stating that “[d]ischarged oil and some of the 
response activities to address the discharges of oil have resulted in injury to, loss of, loss of 
use of or destruction of natural resources in and around the Gulf of Mexico … and also have 
impaired or caused the loss of services that those resources provide”).
37. See e.g. Nature Conservancy of Canada, Th e Value of Natural Capital in Settled Areas of 
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made its way into government documents and policies,38 the concept has received 
limited treatment in Canadian legal literature—especially when compared to the 
American scholarship.39 Th is Part also surveys some of the approaches for eco-
system services assessment and valuation that have been developed and applied 
under the American natural resources damages assessment (NRDA) legislation. 
Part II examines the relevant EEA provisions against the background of the existing 
common law framework for environmental sentencing in order to identify and 
assess the opportunities and challenges for integrating ecosystem services in that 
context. Th e article concludes by suggesting that while novel and ambitious, an 
ecosystem services approach to EDA is particularly well-suited for meeting Parlia-
ment’s objectives in passing the EEA. An ecosystem services approach would also 
point Canadian environmental law more fi rmly in what is widely regarded as its 
necessary direction: towards “recogniz[ing] … the true value of nature.”40 
Canada by Nancy Olewiler, (Toronto: Th e Nature Conservancy of Canada, 2004) [Nature 
Conservancy of Canada].
38. For a discussion about the role of ecosystem services in the Canadian economy, see Canada, 
Federal, Provincial and Territorial Governments of Canada, Canadian biodiversity: ecosystem 
status and trends 2010, (Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada, 2010) at 74 [Canadian 
biodiversity]. See also Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Spotlight on Marine Protected 
Areas in Canada, (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2010) (demonstrating the adoption 
of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) defi nition of Marine 
Protection Areas (MPAs), incorporating ecosystem services). In fact, a background paper 
prepared for Environment Canada (EC) by Sustainable Prosperity identifi ed nearly forty 
federal and provincial programs already in place and working across Canada targeting a 
particular type of ecosystem or service. See Sustainable Prosperity, Advancing the Economics 
of Ecosystems and Biodiversity in Canada: A Survey of Economic Instruments for the 
Conservation & Protection of Biodiversity by Alex Kenny et al (Ottawa: Environment 
Canada, 2011) [Sustainable Prosperity]. 
39. For one of the earliest American examples, see James Salzman, “Review Essay: Valuing 
Ecosystem Service” (1997) 24:4 Ecology LQ 887 at 902-03. Salzman notes that “it [is] 
important for environmental lawyers to engage themselves in this research eff ort, both to 
explore the role ecosystem services should play in the law’s development and to infl uence 
the direction of research so that the services provided by nature may be accorded their 
proper value.” For Canadian examples, see Heather McLeod-Kilmurray & Gavin Smith, 
“Unsustainable Development in Canada: Environmental Assessment, Cost-Benefi t Analysis, 
and Environmental Justice in the Tar Sands” (2010) 21 J Envtl L & Prac 65 (arguing that 
ecosystem services should be considered in environmental assessments, among other things); 
Natalie Chalifour, “Encouraging the Transition to Sustainable Forestry in Canada with 
Ecological Fiscal Reform - Potential and Pitfalls” (2004) 14 J Envtl L & Prac 253 (describing 
maintenance of ecosystem services as an element of ecosystem-based forest management); 
and Bruce Pardy, “Goods, Services, and Systems” (2008) 46:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 445. 
40. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Living Beyond Our Means: Natural Assets and Human 
Well-Being, Statement from the Board, (Washington, DC: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
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I. A PRIMER ON ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND VALUATION
While the concept of ecosystem services can be very complex,41 the main idea is 
straightforward: “[E]cosystems are socially valuable and in ways that may not be 
immediately intuited.”42 Societies have long recognized that ecosystems are 
socially valuable in some ways; most environmental laws, including those amended 
by the EEA, are replete with references to the more obvious ways in which 
humans benefi t from ecosystems.43 For a variety of reasons, however, societies 
have been largely ignorant of the fundamental role played by ecosystems in 
sustaining not just human life but also human prosperity.44 
A. ECOSYSTEMS PROCESSES, STRUCTURE, FUNCTION, AND SERVICES
As noted by the authors of Th e Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services, “it is tempting 
to overstate the case for ecosystem services, to try to fi nd them everywhere simply 
because anywhere is in one or another ecosystem.”45 Th e problem is exacerbated 
because the same fl urry of activity that has “provided much insight in how to 
ensure that ecosystem service research is scientifi cally robust and credible”46 has 
also generated several competing defi nitions and classifi cation systems.47 All of 
these, however, share the following two fundamental and interrelated perspectives 
on ecosystem services. First, ecosystem services are distinct from ecosystem 
attributes or properties, variously referred to as conditions, processes, functions, 
and structure—these are the constituents of natural capital that make the fl ow of 
Board, 2005) at 5 online: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment <http://maweb.org/en/
BoardStatement.asp>.
41. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 24 at 9. See also Norgaard, supra note 30. 
42. James Boyd & Spencer Banzhaf, “What are ecosystem services? Th e need for standardized 
environmental accounting units” (2007) 63:2-3 Ecological Econ 616 at 616.
43. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 24 at 23. As one EEA-relevant example, Parliament passed 
the Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act [CNMCAA] because it wanted to 
“provide opportunities for the people of Canada and of the world to appreciate and enjoy 
Canada’s natural and cultural marine heritage… .” See SC 2002, c 18, preamble. 
44. Most explanations centre on modern society’s detachment from the natural world. See 
e.g. Daily, supra note 25; James Salzman, Barton H Th ompson, Jr & Gretchen C Daily, 
“Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law” (2001) 20:2 Stan Envtl LJ 
309 at 311. 
45. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 24 at 15.
46. Rudolf de Groot et al, “Integrating the Ecological and Economic Dimensions in Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Service Valuation” in Pushpam Kumar, ed, Th e Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity: Ecological and Economic Foundations (London: Earthscan, 2010) [TEEB] 9 at 16. 
47. Boyd & Banzhaf, supra note 42 at 616.
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ecosystem goods and services possible. Second, like conventional perspectives on 
environmentally derived benefi ts, ecosystem services “have relevance only to the 
extent human populations benefi t from them. Th ey are purely anthropocentric.”48 
In Nature’s Services, Professor Gretchen Daily described ecosystem services 
as “the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems … sustain 
and fulfi ll human life.”49 In his original study, Professor Robert Costanza referred 
to ecosystem goods and services as “the benefi ts human populations derive … 
from ecosystem functions,” listing seventeen major ecosystem services.50 In its 
2005 report, Valuing Ecosystem Services: Toward Better Environmental Decision 
Making, the United States National Research Council (NRC) also referred to 
ecosystem functions but added ecosystem structure to the mix.51 Th at same year, 
the United Nations released what many consider to be the leading eff ort in terms 
of ecosystem services assessment and research, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
[MEA].52 Th e MEA adopted a broad defi nition of ecosystem services (the benefi ts 
that humans derive from ecosystems),53 which it then divided into four more 
detailed categories:
Provisioning services are the products people obtain from ecosystems, such as food, 
fuel, fi ber, fresh water, and genetic resources. Regulating services are the benefi ts 
people obtain from the regulation of ecosystem processes, including air quality 
maintenance … and water purifi cation. Cultural services are the nonmaterial benefi ts 
people obtain from ecosystems through spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, 
refl ection, recreation, and aesthetic experiences. Supporting services are those that 
are necessary for the production of all other ecosystem services, such as primary 
production, production of oxygen, and soil formation.54
Most of the literature subsequent to the MEA, including the Canadian 
literature, appears to have adopted its classifi cation system.55 While some have 
48.  Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 24 at 15 [emphasis added].
49.  Daily, supra note 25 at 3. 
50.  Costanza et al, supra note 26 at 253-54. For simplicity, Professor Robert Costanza refers to 
ecosystem goods and services together as ecosystem services.
51.  National Research Council, Valuing Ecosystem Services: Toward Better Environmental 
Decision-Making, (Washington, DC: National Academic of Sciences, 2005) at viii online: 
<http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11139> [NRC Report]. Th e NRC was 
unequivocal in its support for this fi eld, which it considered “a prerequisite for sensible 
conservation decisions.”
52.  See online: <http://www.maweb.org/en/index.aspx>. 
53.  Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Current State and 
Trends Assessment, vol 1 (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005) at v [MEA]. 
54.  Ibid at 29.
55.  See e.g. Shuang Liu et al, “Valuing ecosystem services: Th eory, practice, and the need for 
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expressed concerns that the MEA’s “overly generic defi nition of services … can 
confound practical measurement”56 and have urged narrower defi nitions,57 there is 
also recognition that “the conditions and processes underlying ecosystem service pro-
duction are so tightly interlinked that any classifi cation is inherently arbitrary,”58 
and that “perhaps … no fi nal classifi cation can capture the myriad of ways in 
which ecosystems support human life and contribute to human well-being.”59
Bearing in mind these latter two points, this article adopts the defi nition 
and classifi cation framework recently proposed by the United Nations Environ-
mental Program in Th e Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) project.60 
Largely consistent with the analysis undertaken by the NRC, the MEA, and the 
EPA-SAB,61 the TEEB framework makes important distinctions between ecosystem 
structure, processes, functions, services, and benefi ts. 
Like the MEA, TEEB defi nes an ecosystem as a dynamic complex of plant, 
animal, and microorganism communities and the nonliving environment inter-
acting as a functional unit.62 Ecosystem structure is the biophysical architecture 
of an ecosystem,63 while ecosystem processes are the changes and reactions that 
occur within ecosystems, whether physical, chemical, or biological, and include 
decomposition, production, nutrient cycling, and fl uxes of nutrients and energy.64 
Ecosystem function, then, is defi ned as a subset of the interactions between 
ecosystem structure and processes that underpin the capacity of an ecosystem to 
provide goods and services.65 For example: 
a transdisciplinary synthesis” (2010) 1185 Ann NY Academy of Sci 54; Brauman et al, 
supra note 29; EPA, supra note 33; Munns Jr et al, supra note 33. In Canada, see Canadian 
biodiversity, supra note 38; Sustainable Prosperity, supra note 38. 
56. Boyd & Banzhaf, supra note 42 at 623.
57. Ibid at 619. Boyd and Banzhaf also suggest that “ecosystem services are the components of 
nature, directly enjoyed, consumed, or used to yield human well-being.” 
58. Brauman et al, supra note 29 at 69.
59. de Groot et al, supra note 46 at 17.
60. TEEB, supra note 46. 
61. de Groot et al, supra note 46 at 16.
62. TEEB, supra note 46 at xxxiii (glossary defi nition for “Ecosystem”). See also Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: A Framework for Assessment 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005) at 27; EPA, supra note 33 at 12; and NRC Report, 
supra note 51 at 59. 
63. TEEB, supra note 46 at xxxiv (glossary defi nition for “Ecosystem structure”). See also NRC 
Report, ibid at 60. 
64. TEEB, supra note 46 at xxxiv (glossary defi nition for “Ecosystem process”).
65. Ibid at xxxiii (glossary defi nition for “Ecosystem function”). See also EPA, supra note 33 at 
13; NRC Report, supra note 51 at 60. 
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[P]rimary production (= process) is needed to maintain a viable fi sh population 
(= function) which can be used (harvested) to provide food (= service); nutrient 
cycling (= process) is needed for water purifi cation (= function) to provide clean 
water (= provisioning service).66
Th is distinction between functions (or processes) and services is critical.67 It 
highlights both the potential and the limitations of ecosystem services as a frame-
work for environmental valuation:
For example, the ability to absorb fl oodwater is a biophysical function. A service 
is created if the absorbed fl oodwater yields less damage to buildings, roads, and 
agriculture. Even if an ecosystem rates highly in terms of a functional characteristic, 
that function may not provide a socially valuable service. While anthropocentric, 
the notion of service value is the best practical means of diff erentiating between 
ecosystems when making diffi  cult tradeoff s. Biophysical characterizations are 
fundamental to any ecosystem evaluation, but they are a poor guide to an ecosystem’s 
social value.68 
With respect to ecosystem services, TEEB essentially follows the MEA’s 
typology (including the four categories), except that it makes a fi ner distinction 
between services and benefi ts, clarifi es that the term “ecosystem services” is 
synonymous with ecosystem goods and services, and substitutes habitat services 
for supporting services. Ecosystem services are thus conceived as “the direct and 
indirect contributions of ecosystems to human well-being,”69 and include the 
following twenty-two main service types:70 
PROVISIONING SERVICES
1. Food (e.g., fi sh, game, fruit)
2. Water (e.g., for drinking, irrigation, cooling)
3. Raw Materials (e.g., fi ber, timber, fuel wood, fodder, fertilizer)
4. Genetic resources (e.g., for crop-improvement and medicinal purposes)
5. Medicinal resources (e.g., biochemical products, models & test-organisms)
6. Ornamental resources (e.g., artisan work, decorative plants, pet animals, fashion)
66. de Groot et al, supra note 46 at 18. 
67. See Heather Tallis & Stephen Polasky, “Mapping and Valuing Ecosystem Services as an 
Approach for Conservation and Natural-Resource Management” (2009) 1162 Ann NY 
Academy of Sci 265 at 271. Tallis & Polasky suggest: “Until there is some person somewhere 
who is benefi ting from a given process [function] it is only a process and not a service.” 
68. James Boyd, Dennis King & Lisa A Wainger, “Compensation for Lost Ecosystem Services: 
Th e Need for Benefi t-Based Transfer Ratios and Restoration Criteria” (2001) 20:2 Stan Envtl 
LJ 393 at 396.
69. TEEB, supra note 46 at xxxiv [emphasis added]. See also EPA, supra note 33 at 12, defi ning 
ecosystem services as “the direct or indirect contributions that ecosystems make to the well-
being of human populations.” 
70. de Groot et al, supra note 46 at 25.
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REGULATING SERVICES
7. Air quality regulation (e.g., capturing (fi ne) dust, chemicals, etc.)
8. Climate regulation (incl. carbon-sequestration, infl uence of vegetation on rain-
fall, etc.)
9. Moderation of extreme events (e.g., storm protection and fl ood prevention)
10. Regulation of water fl ows (e.g., natural drainage, irrigation and drought pre-
vention)
11. Waste treatment (especially water purifi cation)
12. Erosion prevention
13. Maintenance of soil fertility (incl. soil formation)
14. Pollination
15. Biological control (e.g., seed dispersal, pest and disease control)
HABITAT SERVICES
16. Maintenance of life cycles of migratory species (incl. nursery service)
17. Maintenance of genetic diversity (especially in gene pool protection)
CULTURAL & AMENITY SERVICES
18. Aesthetic information
19. Opportunities for recreation & tourism
20. Inspiration for culture, art and design
21. Spiritual experience
22. Information for cognitive development
Of course, not all ecosystems provide all of these services, and provision varies 
with scale and location. For example, wetlands (e.g., marshes, fens, peatlands) 
provide numerous local, regional, and global services, including fl ood protection, 
storm protection, water supply, improved water quality, waste assimilation, 
commercial and recreational hunting and fi shing, harvesting of natural materials, 
energy resources, and climate stabilization.71 
To put these services in more concrete terms, it is useful to consider the 
results of Professor Nancy Olewiler’s 2004 study, Th e Value of Natural Capital in 
Settled Areas of Canada: 
• Four-tenths of a hectare of wetlands can store over 6,000 cubic 
meters of fl oodwater. … [regulating service, specifi cally moderation 
of extreme events];
71. Luke M Brander, Raymond J G M Florax & Jan E Vermaat, “Th e Empirics of Wetland 
Valuation: A Comprehensive Summary and a Meta-Analysis of the Literature” (2006) 
33:2 Envtl & Resource Econ 223 at 226; Richard T Woodward & Yong-Suhk Wui, “Th e 
economics value of wetland services: a meta-analysis” (2000) 37:2 Ecological Econ 257. 
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• Approximately 600 species of wildlife, including species at risk, use 
wetlands in North America during … their life cycle. …  [habitat 
services];
• [Wetlands produce] a wealth of products including fi sh and 
shellfi sh, blueberries, cranberries, timber and wild rice, as well 
as medicines that are derived from wetland soils and plants. … 
[provisioning services];
• [W]etland plants … can remove between 116 and 770 kg/ha/yr of 
phosphorus and 350 to 32,000 kg/ha/yr of nitrogen. … While these 
estimates have a wide range [due to diff erences in wetland location, 
plant composition, and soil type], even the most conservative estimate 
exceeds the amount of excess nitrogen and phosphorus that fi nds its 
way into the [Fraser Valley’s] water supplies from current agricultural 
practices.72 [regulating services, specifi cally waste treatment]
Finally, it should be clear from this brief survey that the goal has not been 
merely to identify a subset of hitherto unrecognized contributions towards 
human well-being, but rather to construct a framework through which all contri-
butions, including long-recognized and familiar ones, could be conceptualized, 
organized, and ultimately valued.73 It is for this reason that ecosystem services 
assessment would be well-suited for environmental sentencing, as further 
discussed below in Part II.
B. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES GIVE RISE TO USE AND NON-USE VALUES
In its most basic terms, environmental valuation is economic valuation—“the 
valuation in monetary terms of items that people might care for”74—applied to 
the natural world. Th e goal is to determine the utility, or satisfaction, that 
individuals derive from the environment. It is not to discern the objective value 
of ecosystems with a view towards sustainability or intergenerational equity,75 
72. Nature Conservancy of Canada, supra note 37 at 6, 15. See also online: Ducks Unlimited 
Canada <http://www.ducks.ca/conserve/wetland_values/index.html>.
73. Professors Ruhl, Kraft & Lant seem to take a diff erent approach, defi ning ecosystem services 
as a discrete set of benefi ts alongside more conventional ones. See supra note 24 at 23.
74. Hanemann, supra note 21 at 66.
75. Robert Costanza & Carl Folke, “Valuing Ecosystem Services with Effi  ciency, Fairness, and 
Sustainability as Goals” in Daily, supra note 25 at 49. Th e authors write:
Valuation ultimately refers to the contribution of an item to meeting a specifi c goal. … In 
ecology, a gene is valuable to the extent it contributes to the goal of survival of the individuals 
possessing it and their progeny. In conventional economics, a commodity is valuable to the 
extent it contributes to the goal of individual welfare as assessed by willingness to pay. Th e 
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although the existence of such concerns by individuals can and does aff ect this 
exercise. In other words, environmental valuation is positivistic rather than 
normative, asking what value people place on the environment in light of 
competing preferences as opposed to how much value they perhaps should place.
Economists divide environmental values into two basic categories: use value 
and non-use value (the latter was referred to as “passive” value in Canfor).76 Use 
values arise where utility is derived from actual use of the environment. Th ey can 
be consumptive, as where fi sh are used for food, or non-consumptive, as in the 
case of bird watching.77 Use values can also be direct or indirect. In the preceding 
examples, the fi sh and birds are directly valued. Th eir survival, however, depends on 
their habitat, the appreciation of which gives rise to indirect use value.78 Economists 
have also long recognized that “[m]any people donate to conservation charities 
concerned with protecting wildlife they will never directly experience, such as 
tigers or whales, or with protecting natural areas they may never travel to.”79 
Th ese are non-use values80 and include the existence, option, and bequest values 
identifi ed in Canfor.81
What then, is the relationship between use and non-use values and ecosystem 
services? 
Th e array of services provided by ecosystems spans all of … [the] categories of values. 
Th e pest-control and fl ood-control services they off er have direct use value to nearby 
agricultural producers. Th eir provision of habitats for migratory birds implies an 
point is that one cannot state a value without stating the goal being served. Conventional 
economic value is based on the goal of individual utility maximization. But other goals, and 
thus other values, are possible. For example, if the goal is sustainability, one should assess value 
based on the contribution to achieving that goal.  
76. Nick Hanley, “Th e Economic Value of Environmental Damage” in Michael Bowman & Alan 
Boyle, eds, Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 27 at 27; Canfor, supra note 9 at para 11. 
77. See Frank B Cross, “Natural Resource Damage Valuation” (1989) 42:2 Vand L Rev 269. 
Cross notes:
A 1975 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) study found that some twenty 
million Americans participated in “sport hunting,” spending nearly six billion dollars in the 
process. When the same family goes bird watching, they still use and value the resources, but in 
a non-consumptive way. Th e magnitude of non-consumptive use of natural resources consider-
ably exceeds even consumptive uses (at 281). 
78. Lawrence H Goulder & Donald Kennedy, “Valuing Ecosystem Services: Philosophical Bases 
and Empirical Methods” in Daily, supra note 25 at 23.
79. Hanley, supra note 76 at 27.
80. See Jason J Czarnezki & Adrianne K Zahner, “Th e Utility of Non-Use Values In Natural 
Resource Damage Assessments” (2005) 32 BC Envtl Aff  L Rev 509 at 511-512.
81. Supra note 9 at paras 138-40.
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indirect use value to people who enjoy watching or hunting these animals … . 
Ecosystems also yield an existence value: wetlands, for example, provide such value 
to people who simply appreciate the fact that wetlands exist.82 
In the specifi c language of the TEEB/MEA framework, direct use values 
are generally derived from provisioning and cultural services and are typically 
enjoyed by people located in the ecosystem itself.83 Fishing and bird watching 
are two examples. Indirect use values are “derived from ecosystem services that 
provide benefi ts outside the ecosystem itself. Examples include the natural water 
fi ltration function of wetlands, which often benefi ts people far downstream … 
Th is category of benefi ts corresponds to the MA notion of regulating services.”84 
Option values are derived from preserving for future use services that may not 
be used presently. Th e value derived from preservation for one’s own future use is 
called option value; that derived from preservation for one’s heirs is called bequest 
value.85 Finally, non-use values largely fall within the cultural services category. 
Th e sum of all of these values represents the Total Economic Value (TEV) of a 
given ecosystem asset.86 
Because it is not possible to measure utility itself, economists rely on individuals’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) or, in certain limited circumstances, willingness to 
accept compensation (WTA) as a measure of utility.87 Where utility is derived 
from private goods available in a market, such as a car, economists are often satisfi ed 
to rely on the market price of such goods as a measure of WTP (and thus utility). 
In the case of most ecosystem goods and services, however, their status as public 
goods for which no private markets exist requires the application of non-market 
valuation techniques. 
Returning again to the wetlands of the Fraser Valley, Professor Olewiler found 
a number of studies applying such techniques (some of which are discussed 
further below) that estimated the value of all the goods and services provided 
82. Goulder & Kennedy in Daily, supra note 25 at 25. Th e relationships are also well captured in 
fi gures found in the NRC Report, supra note 51 at 241; and de Groot et al, supra note 46 at 
17. 
83. Supra note 53 at 54. 
84. Ibid at 54.
85. Ibid.
86. Originally coined by David Pearce. See Economic values and the natural world (London: 
Earthscan, 1993). See also Unai Pascaul et al, “Th e Economics of Valuing Ecosystem Services 
and Biodiversity” in TEEB, supra note 46, 183 at 188. 
87. “[I]f individuals are deemed to have the right to enjoy the pre-loss level of environmental 
quality, then … [WTA] should be measured; alternatively, if they have no such right, then 
WTP measures should be sought.” Hanley, supra note 76 at 28.
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by one hectare of wetlands between $5,792 and $24,330 per year. Using the 
lower estimate, the approximately forty thousand hectares of Lower Fraser 
Valley wetlands have an annual value of $231.7 million.88 More recently, a report 
commissioned by the Boreal Forest Initiative estimates the value of seventeen 
ecosystem services from Canada’s northern Mackenzie Region alone at $570.6 
billion per year.89 
C.  TOOLS FOR ASSESSMENT AND VALUATION: THE NRDA EXPERIENCE 
Ecosystem services assessment and valuation can be carried out for various purposes, 
including land-use decision making90 and natural-resource management.91 
Th e context most relevant to EDA, natural resources damages assessment 
(NRDA) under CERCLA and OPA, also happens to be the most established and 
sophisticated.92 
CERCLA was US Congress’s response to the improper disposal of hazardous 
substances for over half a century and to the enormous environmental degradation 
associated therewith.93 Primarily a civil liability scheme designed to apportion the 
88. Nature Conservancy of Canada, supra note 37 at 15.
89. Canadian Boreal Initiative, Th e Real Wealth of the Mackenzie Region by Mark Alnielski & 
Sara Wilson (Ottawa: Canadian Boreal Initiative, 2009) at 1, online: 
<http://www.borealcanada.ca>.
90. In a 2006 article, author and journalist Chris Wood described eff orts by Ontario’s Grand 
River Conservation Authority to keep that basin’s “water factories” clean that are akin, in 
purpose if not in scale, to what has been described as the “poster child” for recognizing 
ecosystem services—the City of New York’s decision to restore the degraded Catskill 
watershed to ensure the provision of clean drinking water at a fraction of the cost of building 
a new and otherwise necessary water fi ltration plan. See Chris Wood, “Th e Business of Saving 
the Earth”, Th e Walrus (October 2008), online: Th e Walrus <http://walrusmagazine.com/
articles/2008.10-environment-chris-wood-water-economy/>. 
91. In 2008, the US Army Corps of Engineers and the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) jointly published fi nal regulations introducing ecosystem services into the decision-
making standards for authorizing compensatory mitigation of impacts to aquatic resources 
under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 USC §1251 (1972) [CWA]. See JB Ruhl, James 
Salzman & Iris Goodman, “Implementing the New Ecosystem Services Mandate: A Catalyst 
for Advancing Science and Policy” (2009) 31:2 Nat’l Wetlands Newsletter 11. Th e United 
Stated Forestry Service has also recognized the need to consider ecosystem services in carrying 
out its mandate. See online: <http://www.fs.fed.us/ecosystemservices>. 
92. Shuang Liu et al, supra note 55 at 64. See also James Boyd, Dennis King & Lisa A Wainger, 
“Compensation for Lost Ecosystem Services: Th e Need for Benefi t-Based Transfer Ratios and 
Restoration Criteria” (2001) 20:2 Stan Envtl LJ 393 at 402. 
93. Jeff rey G Miller & Craig N Johnston, Th e Law of Hazardous Waste Disposal and Remediation, 
2d ed (New York: West, 2005) at 52. See also Cross, supra note 22; and Binger, Copple & 
Hoff man, supra note 22.
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costs of cleaning up contaminated sites among “potentially responsible parties” 
(PRPs), subsection 9607(a)(4)(C) also authorizes “trustees” to recover damages 
“for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable 
costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss” resulting from a release of haz-
ardous substances.94 Th e OPA was Congress’s response to the 1989 Exxon Valdez 
oil spill and contains essentially the same NRDA provisions.95 
Recognizing that the measurement of such damages would be diffi  cult, 
Congress delegated the task of promulgating regulations to the President. In the 
case of CERCLA, they specifi ed that two types of procedures should be developed: 
relatively simple Type A assessment procedures, which would be applicable to 
minor releases; and more complex Type B assessment procedures, to be used 
when the damage to natural resources was more signifi cant and required extensive 
fi eld work.96 No such distinction is made in the OPA,97 the regulations under 
which are the responsibility of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration (NOAA). While the procedures in these regulations are not mandatory, 
their use triggers a rebuttable presumption of accuracy with respect to the assessment 
of damages in the context of litigation.98 
CERCLA Type A procedures use computer programs to model the fate of 
released substances, predict injuries, and calculate damages.99 Certain states, 
including California, Washington, and Florida, have followed suit and designed 
their own simplifi ed procedures,100 which employ schedules or formulae to determine 
damages.101 Th ese usually require a limited set of data, such as the type of habitat 
in which a spill or release has occurred, the amount of the spill, and the duration 
of the event. 
94. 42 USC §9607. See Cross, supra note 22 at 321. Cross notes that “the defi nition of natural 
resources includes “land, fi sh, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water 
supplies, and other such resources” (at 321). Damages recovered by the government are to be 
“available for use to restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources” 
by the appropriate agencies of the federal government or the state government.
95. See 33 USCA § 2702 for the defi nition of damages and § 2701 for the defi nition of natural 
resources. 
96. 42 USCA § 9651(c)(2) 
97. 33 USCA § 2706(e)(1)
98. For CERCLA, see § 107 (f )(2)(C). For OPA, see 33 USC § 2707 (1990).
99. Natural Resource Damages for Hazardous Substances 73 CFR Part 11 (2008) [NRDHS].
100. Ibid.
101. Amy W Ando & Madhu Khanna, “Natural Resource Damage Assessment Methods: Lessons 
in Simplicity from State Trustees” (2004) 22:4 Contemporary Econ Pol’y 504. 
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CERCLA Type B and OPA procedures rely on the concept of services as their 
metric for damages.102 Somewhat surprisingly—given that neither CERCLA nor 
the OPA contain any reference to this term and that the initial publication of 
both sets of regulations predated the fl urry of activity with respect to ecosystem 
services described in the previous Part103—the defi nition of services in both the 
CERCLA and the OPA regulations is entirely consistent with the ecosystem services 
concept described here.104 Th e NOAA’s Damage Assessment, Remediation, and 
Restoration Program (DARRP) website specifi cally references the MEA and 
explains that “[t]his injury assessment process is based on the understanding that 
functioning ecosystems provide multiple ecosystem services that are critical to day-
to-day activities on this planet.”105
Th at being said, because the focus under both statutory schemes is increasingly 
on restoring damaged natural resources, including for interim loss,106 ecosystem 
102. Th us, the goal of the OPA regulations is to “make the environment and public whole for 
injuries to natural resources and services,” which is achieved by retuning these to baseline 
conditions and compensating for interim losses from the date of the incident until recovery: 
see 15 CFR § 990.10 (2012). Th e CERCLA regulations take a more circuitous route. Th e 
purpose of the damage determination phase under the CERCLA regulations is “to establish 
the amount of money to be sought in compensation for injuries to natural resources,” 
where the measure of damages is the cost of either restoration of the injured resources or 
the replacement of equivalent natural resources, both of which are measured in terms of the 
level of services provided by the injured resource at baseline, and may include “compensable 
value”: see 43 CFR § 11.80 (2007). Compensable value includes “the economic value of lost 
services provided by the injured resources, including both public use and non-use values such 
as existence and bequest values.” Both use and non-use values are further defi ned as deriving 
from services: see 43 CFR § 11.83 (2007).
103. See Katharine K Baker, “Consorting with Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to Natural 
Resources and How We Should Value Th eir Loss” (1995) 22 Ecology LQ 677 at 705 (and 
footnote 143 in particular).
104. Under the OPA regulations, “[s]ervices (or natural resource services) means the functions 
performed by a natural resource for the benefi t of another natural resource and/or the 
public”: see 15 CFR § 990.30 (2012). Under the CERCLA regulations, “services” means the 
physical and biological functions performed by the resource including the human uses of 
those functions. Th ese services are the result of the physical, chemical, or biological quality of 
the resource”: see 43 CFR § 11.14 (2007). 
105. Online: Damage Assessment, Restoration, & Restoration Program <http://darrp.noaa.
gov/economics/index.html> [DAARP] [emphasis in original]. Th e DAARP also “provides 
permanent expertise within NOAA to assess and restore natural resources injured by 
releases of oil and hazardous substances, as well as by physical impacts, such as vessel 
groundings in National Marine Sanctuaries.” See online: DAARP <http://www.darrp.noaa.
gov/about/index.html>. 
106. See NRDHS, supra note 99.  
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services are decreasingly likely to be valued directly. Instead, they are likely to be 
valued indirectly in terms of the cost of carrying out restoration projects:
[S]ervice-to-service scaling is the preferred approach for determining the required 
amount of compensatory restoration following an injury. In this approach, 
the services lost from natural resource injury are equated to the services gained from 
restoration. Using the critical assumption that the services lost from the injury are of 
the same type and value as those restored through a compensatory project, no direct 
valuation of the injured resources or restored resources occurs.107
According to the regulatory impact analysis that accompanied the 2008 
revisions to the CERCLA regulations, scaling techniques such as Habitat 
Equivalency Analysis (HEA) “are frequently simpler and more transparent 
than methodologies used to measure the economic value of losses.”108 In Canada, 
restoration costs have also been advanced as the presumptive measure of envi-
ronmental damages.109
Direct environmental valuation becomes necessary where restoration 
is impractical, inadequate, or otherwise deemed inappropriate. Much has been 
written about the various tools that can be employed for this purpose, which econ-
omists group into two categories: revealed and stated preference techniques.110 
Th e former includes market price (primarily as a measure of consumptive use 
value, e.g., for provisioning services such as fi sh), travel cost (primarily as a measure 
Th e NRDAR advisory committee recommended that DOI should amend its current regulation 
to explicitly authorize trustees to use the cost of restoration actions that address service losses to 
calculate all damages, including interim losses.  Providing the option for a ‘restoration-based’ 
approach to all damages better comports with CERCLA’s overall restoration objectives.
 See “Natural Resource Damages for Hazardous Substances,” 73 Federal Register 192 (2 
October 2008) at 57260.  
107. DAARP, supra note 105. 
108. NRDHS, supra note 99 at 11083. In Canada, Habitat Equivalency Analysis (HEA) has been 
considered for the purpose of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans’ (DFO) fi sh habitat 
compensation program pursuant to its Fisheries Act authorization policy (commonly referred 
to as its “No Net Loss policy”). See RSC 1985, c F-14, s 35(2) [Fisheries Act]. See also 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Review of Approaches for Estimating Changes in Productive 
Capacity from Whole-lake / Stream Destruction and Related Compensation Projects by G A 
Packman et al (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2006) at 43. 
109. OLRC Report, supra note 8 at 56.
110. Most of these methodologies, and their strengths and weaknesses, are discussed by 
Professors Elgie and Lintner in their case comment on Canfor. See supra note 15. See also 
OLRC Report, supra note 8; and Edgar Gold, David L VanderZwaag & Meinhard Doelle, 
“Economic Loss and Environmental Damages: Developments in Claims for Off shore Oil 
Pollution” (1991) 1 J Envtl L & Prac 129; and supra notes 22 and supra note 94 (American 
literature within). 
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of use value, but including both consumptive and non-consumptive uses, e.g., 
recreational services such as fi shing and bird watching, respectively) and hedonic 
pricing (using property value to estimate environmental values, especially non-use 
values). Probably the most controversial example of a stated preference technique 
is contingent valuation (CV), which essentially involves conducting surveys designed 
to elicit individuals’ preferences for the environment or specifi c goods and services. 
All these techniques were discussed to some extent in Canfor.111 
Another method for valuation is benefi t transfer. Benefi t transfer uses 
information derived from existing valuation studies to assign values in another 
context. Since 1992, Environment Canada (EC) has been working with various 
international experts and organizations, including the US Environmental Protection 
Agency, to develop and implement a benefi t transfer “infobase” called the Envi-
ronmental Valuation Reference Inventory (EVRI).112 
Th is is not to suggest that ecosystem services assessment and valuation is an 
exact science. “Even when valuation is informed by the best available science, 
the valuation process will almost always involve uncertainty. Uncertainty arises 
in the prediction of changes in ecosystems, in the resulting change in the fl ow 
of services, and in estimating the values associated with those changes.”113 Th at 
being said, most environmental regulation operates on the frontier of science, 
where “scientifi c uncertainty is endemic.”114 Moreover, in the specifi c context of 
ecosystem services valuation, many observers agree that uncertainties result in 
underestimation rather than overestimation of value.115 
II. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES-BASED EDA UNDER THE EEA
A. CURRENT APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING IN CANADA
In Canfor, the Court drew a distinction between physical damages and compensable 
loss, highlighting an important distinction between civil and criminal liability:
111. Supra note 9 at paras 141-43.
112. Online: Environmental Valuation Reference Inventory <https://www.evri.ca/Other/
AboutEVRI.aspx>. For example, a keynote search for “wetlands” by the author generated 199 
results, including Professor Olewiler’s study, supra note 37. 
113. EPA, supra note 33 at 16.
114. See generally Daniel A Farber, “Building Bridges over Troubled Waters: Eco-pragmatism and 
the Environmental Prospect” (2003) 87:4 Minn L Rev 852 at 855.
115. See e.g. Costanza et al, supra note 26 at 258. See also EPA, supra note 33 at 16 (discussing the 
problems that the public’s general lack of understanding about ecosystem services can pose 
for valuation). 
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Th is appeal is thus not about proof of physical damages, but about the proof and 
assessment of compensable loss … . [I]n assessing compensatory damages for envi-
ronmental loss, the Court ought not to be engaged merely in punishment of the 
wrongdoer (which is the domain of regulatory off ences) or imputing losses based 
on little more than a generalized desire to mete out rough justice to a tortfeasor.”116
In other words, civil liability and liability for regulatory (variously referred 
to as “statutory” or “public welfare”)117 off ences serve diff erent purposes. In the 
former context, the driving principle is restitutio in integrum: “restoration to the 
previous condition or the status quo,”118 fairness being “best achieved by avoiding 
both undercompensation and overcompensation.”119 In the regulatory context, 
on the other hand, the general purpose is to impose sanctions that foster “respect 
for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society.”120 In the 
specifi c context of environmental off ences, moreover, most observers agree that 
deterrence and respect for the regulatory process are the primary objectives:
Suffi  ce it to say that Canadian courts have settled upon the need for pollution prevention 
via deterrence, and the need to generate societal respect for the regulatory process, as 
the most relevant objectives of environmental sentencing.
Th e rationale is that since prosecutions occur after an off ence, and the environmental 
damage is already done, any hope for the future protection of the public welfare 
needs to come from any deterrent eff ect of the sentence.121
Although a detailed review of the case law on this point is beyond the scope 
of this article, one of the benchmark decisions on the importance of deterrence is 
the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Cotton Felts Ltd:122 
In our complex interdependent modern society … regulatory statutes are accepted 
as essential in the public interest. … To a very large extent the enforcement of such 
statutes is achieved by fi nes imposed on off ending corporations. Th e amount of 
116. Supra note 9 at para 59 [emphasis in original]. 
117. See R v Sault Ste Marie (City), [1978] SCR 1299, 85 DLR (3d) 161. See also Mark Davidson, 
“Innocent Drops and the Symbolic Generalization of Moral Harms: A New Basis for the 
Criminalization of Environmental Off ences” (2005) 16:1 J Envtl L & Prac 19 at 22-23. 
118. Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed, sub verbo “restitutio in integrum.”
119. Raytch v Bloomer, [1990] 1 SCR 940 at para 47, 69 DLR (4th) 25. 
120. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 718.
121. Elaine L Hughes & Dr Larry A Reynolds, “Creative Sentencing and Environmental 
Protection” (2009) 19:2 J Envtl L & Prac 105 at 108. See also Davidson, supra note 117 
at 37 (discussing deterrence); and Sherie Verhulst, “Legislating a Principled Approach to 
Sentencing in Relation to Regulatory Off ences” (2009) 12:3 Can Crim L Rev 281 at 291. 
122. (1982), 8 WCB 447, 2 CCC (3d) 287 [Cotton Felts]. Th is case was recently cited with 
approval in R v Alpha Manufacturing Inc et al, [2005] BCSC 1644 at para 48, 68 WCB (2d) 
77, and R v Terroco Industries Ltd, 2005 ABCA 141 at para 60, 41 Alta LR (4th) 1 [Terroco]. 
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the fi ne will be determined by a complex set of considerations … . Above all, the 
amount of the fi ne will be determined by the need to enforce regulatory standards 
by deterrence.123
In order to meet these objectives, Canadian courts have long recognized the 
need for a “special approach” to environmental sentencing.124 Probably the most 
often cited cases with respect to what this entails are R v United Keno Hill Mines 
(1980)125 and R v Bata Industries Ltd (1993).126 In the latter case, and relying very 
much on the former, the court set out the following list of factors to be considered 
in sentencing, which continue to guide courts to this day:
a.  Th e Nature of the Environment Aff ected;
b.  Extent of the Injury;
c.  Deliberateness of the Off ence
d.  Th e Attitude of the Accused.127
In sentencing corporations, the Court should also consider the following:
e.    Th e size, wealth, nature of operations and power of the corporation;
f.  Th e extent or attempts to comply;
g.  Remorse;
h.  Profi ts realized by the off ence; and
i.   Criminal record or other evidence of good character.128
Of relevance here is that Canadian courts have long considered it necessary 
to take into account the nature of the environment aff ected and the extent of 
actual or potential damage caused by an off ence. Perhaps the most explicit plea 
for such evidence was made in United Keno Hill itself:
In environmental cases, the courts do and should vary the severity of punishment 
in accord with the nature of the environment aff ected and the extent of damage 
infl icted.
123. Cotton Felts, supra note 122 at para 19. 
124. See R v Kenaston Drill (Arctic) LTD (1973), 12 CCC (2d) 383, [1973] NWTJ No 1 (SC). 
Th is case was cited with approval in United Keno Hill, supra note 7. 
125. For a more recent example, see R v Schuizke, 2008 SKPC 149 at paras 32, 55, 88, 328 Sask 
R 112. As of 2005, United Keno Hill had been followed 19 times and mentioned 31 times. 
See Davidson, supra note 117 at 36, n 68.
126. [1995] OR (3d) 321 127 DLR (4th) 438 (Ont CA),, rev’g in part [1993] 14 OR (3d) 354, 
11 CELR (NS) 208 (Ont Gen Div), rev’g on other grounds [1992] OR (3d) 329, 7 CELR 
(NS) 245 (ONCJ PD) [Bata]. 
127. [1993], ibid at para 20 [emphasis added].
128. See Stanley David Berger, Th e Prosecution and Defence of Environmental Off ences (Aurora: 
Canada Law Book, 2008) at 7:13.   
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(a) Nature of Environment
A unique ecological area supporting rare fl ora and fauna, a high-use recreational 
watershed, or an essential wildlife habitat, are environments calling upon users to 
exercise special care. Any injury to such areas must be more severely condemned 
than environmental damage to less sensitive areas.
(b) Extent of Injury 
Penalties should refl ect the degree of damage infl icted ... In some instances not only 
the actual damage caused but [also] the potential damage that might have emanated 
from the polluter’s activities must be considered. …  
As in assault off ences the more severe the beating the greater the condemnation ex-
pressed in sentencing. Similarly, evidence of injury should be tendered in environ-
mental cases. … 
Most sentencing dispositions in environmental cases necessitate expert and technical 
evidence to describe the extent of environmental harm caused by the off ence.129
Canadian courts have long been willing (if not eager) to consider detailed, 
technical expert evidence with respect to actual and potential environmental 
harm. Th at being said, they have also recognized that ascertaining and quantifying 
harm is diffi  cult in most environmental cases.130 Even where evidence of harm 
has been introduced, there does not appear to be any consistent approach for 
translating such harm into a monetary fi gure other than perhaps the principle of 
parity, which requires “similar sentences to similar off enders for similar off ences 
committed in similar circumstances.”131 
Two exceptions are R v Carriere132 and R v George M Caseley & Sons Inc.133 
Th e former is demonstrative of Canadian judges’ willingness to seriously engage 
the issue of environmental harm generally and an economic approach to sentencing 
specifi cally; the latter illustrates some of the challenges that prosecutors will face 
when introducing such evidence. While Canadian courts have recognized that 
environmental harm has an economic component in other cases,134 these two 
129. Supra note 7 at paras 11-14, 16.
130. For a recent case, see R v Northwest Territories Power Corp, 2011 NWTTC 3 at para 89, 2011 
CELR (3d) 257 [Northwest Territories].
131. Ibid at para 107 (citing section 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code). See also Terroco, supra note 
122 at para 65. 
132. 2005 SKPC 84, 272 Sask R 13 [Carriere].
133. (2004) CELR (3d) 178, 716 APR 194 (PEPC) [Caseley]. 
134. See e.g. R v Corner Brook Pulp and Paper Ltd (2010), 53 CELR (3d) 108 at paras 23, 25, 
317 Nfl d & PEIR 309 (NFPC); Fletcher v Kingston (City), [1999] OJ 5705 (QL) at para 3 
(ONCJ PD); R v New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, 10 CELR (NS) 184 at para 49, 
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decisions stand out for the extent to which the courts explored economic principles 
and tools in the context of quantifying environmental harm. 
In R v Carriere, the accused were convicted of an off ence under the Migratory 
Birds Convention Act [MBCA] (one of the statutes amended by the EEA), namely, 
the illegal taking of birds. Justice Robinson observed that:
Paragraph 13(4.1)(a) of the [pre-EEA] Migratory Birds Convention Act 1994 says 
that a court imposing a sentence shall take into account “the harm or risk of harm 
caused by the commission of the off ence.” Th e question thus arising is, “What is the 
harm or risk of harm caused by the accused’s actions?” …
By accepting that harm would result from a reduction in wild duck populations, I 
am necessarily assuming that wild ducks have a value. But what value? … [A] proper 
assessment of the harm or risk of harm … cannot occur without at least some 
understanding of what wild ducks are worth. 
[T]he Convention recognizes that “many of these species [migratory birds]  are of 
great value as a source of food or in destroying insects which are injurious to forests 
and forage plants on the public domain, as well as to agricultural crops, in both 
Canada and the Unites States … .”
Some of the values might be impossible to quantify in dollars, but they are important 
nonetheless. Few would suggest there is no aesthetic value in seeing large fl ocks of 
ducks fl ying overhead during the fall migration.
Ducks also have a real dollar value when used for some purposes, most notably, sport 
hunting. As set out in fi gures below, sport hunters kill as many as 14 million ducks 
each year in North America … . It would have been very useful to know what an 
individual duck is worth in dollars to the sport hunting industry. Is it $10 or $100 
or something quite diff erent? As it is, I am left to assume that ducks have a signifi cant 
value to the industry without having any precise fi gure for what that value might be.135
Th us, while Justice Robinson was technically (albeit understandably, bearing 
in mind the lack of submissions on this point) wrong in concluding that 
aesthetic values are impossible to quantify in monetary terms, he was prescient 
in recognizing that ducks confer numerous benefi ts to society, including provisioning 
services (e.g., food), regulating services (e.g., biological control), and cultural and 
amenity services (e.g., hunting and bird watching), and in his willingness to consider 
their economic value for the purposes of sentencing. 
In R v Caseley, on the other hand, Justice Th omson seemed less willing to 
consider economic value. Th at case involved the deposit of pesticides into the 
Wilmot River from an adjacent fi eld following a large rain event, contrary to 
[1991] NBJ 1144 (NBCP); United Keno Hill, supra note 7 at para 9. 
135. Carriere, supra note 132 at paras 21, 23-24, 26-27. 
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subsection 36(3) of the Fisheries Act.136 The Crown sought to quantify the 
environmental harm not only as the costs of restocking and monitoring the 
Wilmot River (for a total of $12,800),137 but also to include what the court 
deemed “more intangible losses which economists apparently believe occur from 
these kinds of events”:
Ms. DeBaie assigned a dollar value to the time spent by volunteers although they 
were unpaid. She assigned a dollar value to the work of government employees 
although no additional staff  were hired as a result of this off ence. She assigned a dollar 
value to the recreational enjoyment of individual fi shers and multiplied it by the 
projected numbers of fi shers who might be expected to use the Wilmot River, and 
multiplied that by the number of days that those individuals might have fi shed. … 
Ms. DeBaie then attempted to quantify the total overall  economic impact of resident, 
visiting non-resident Canadian, and visiting non-Canadian fi shers not fi shing on 
Prince Edward Island and in the case of non-residents, apparently not even visiting 
Prince Edward Island because of the closure of the Wilmot River to recreational 
fi shing. Ms. DeBaie estimates that the total impact could be as high as $690,000 per 
year while the river remains closed.
Th e diffi  culty which the Court has with Ms. DeBaie’s evidence is that it is for the 
most part not based on empirically grounded data. Th ere is no evidence of how 
many people fi shed the Wilmot River, on average, before its closure. Th ere is no 
evidence that even one fi sher stopped fi shing in east Prince County because of the 
closure. Th ere is no evidence that even one visitor failed to come to Prince Edward 
Island and fi sh because of the closure.
[W]ithout evidence based on hard data, in the Court’s view, Ms. DeBaie’s conclusion 
must be regarded as speculation and insuffi  cient grounds upon which to base any 
form of restitution order.138
Although perhaps not as dismissive as the defendant’s expert in Canfor, who 
characterized environmental loss valuations as “airy-fairy,”139 Justice Th omson was 
clearly skeptical of the Crown’s evidence and its approach to environmental harm 
generally. While some of his concerns were valid, his disbelief was misplaced. Th e 
work of volunteers, for example, refl ects the existence of non-use values derived 
from the Wilmot River’s cultural services. With respect to the work of govern-
ment employees, American courts have determined that recoverable costs under 
CERLCA include both case-specifi c government expenses and indirect costs, 
136. Supra note 108. 
137. Caseley, supra note 133 at para 9.
138. Ibid at paras 10-13 [emphasis added].
139. Supra note 9 at para 59.
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recognizing that in a world of budgets and limited resources, expending and even 
redirecting funds is also refl ective of the value of the ecosystem.140
Finally, numerous Canadian environmental laws authorize compensation to 
persons or to relevant government departments for what are essentially ecosystem 
service losses caused by conduct that contravenes those laws or any regulations 
made thereunder.141 Section 42 of the Fisheries Act, for example, not only makes 
polluters civilly liable to the Crown for remediation costs, it also allows commercial 
fi shers to recover lost income “to the extent that the loss can be established to 
have been incurred as a result of the deposit” of deleterious substances.142 Th is is, 
in eff ect, an action for the loss of provisioning services (i.e., of fi sh for food)—
a loss that fi gured prominently in the damage assessment following the Exxon 
Valdez spill and that will likely fi gure prominently in damages claims against BP 
following the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico.143 
Justice Th omson’s decision is nevertheless useful for several reasons. It 
suggests that restoration costs may not always adequately refl ect ecosystem 
service losses, especially cultural services. It also identifi es some of the challenges 
that prosecutors are bound to face when introducing such evidence. For example, 
the Crown should have introduced evidence (as would be required in an action 
under subsection 42(3)) about the actual extent of fi shing before and after the 
off ence in order to establish the loss (including potential loss) in this instance.144 
Th e decision also serves as a reminder that the Crown must prove the existence of 
an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.145 
140. United States Environmental Protection Agency v Bell Petroleum Services Inc, 734 F Supp 771, 
rev’d on other grounds, 3 F 3(d) 889 (5th Circuit 1993). 
141. See e.g. CEPA, 1999, supra note 3, s 40.
142. Fisheries Act, supra note 108, s 42(3). See Gold, VanderZwaag & Doelle, supra note 111 at 149. 
143. Keith H Hirokawa, “Disasters And Ecosystem Services Deprivation: From Cuyahoga to Th e 
Deepwater Horizon, (2011) 74:1 Alb L Rev at 555. Hirokawa observes:
Th e Gulf ’s provisioning services aff ect the entire nation’s seafood markets and the region’s econ-
omy. In 2008, commercial fi shermen in the Gulf of Mexico supported a commercial fi shing 
harvest of 1.27 billion pounds of fi nfi sh and shellfi sh at a value of $659 million in landings 
revenue [emphasis in original]. 
144. As an example, an assessment of the recreational fi shery value provided by the Credit River, 
near Toronto, Ontario, indicated recreational benefi ts of $1.2 million dollars per year to 
anglers who fi sh the Credit. See Pembina Institute & Credit Valley Conservation, Natural 
Credit: Estimating the Value of Natural Capital in the Credit River Watershed by Mike 
Kennedy & Jeff  Wilson (Drayton Valley: Pembina Institute, 2009) at 31, online: Pembina 
Institute <www.pembina.org> [Pembina Institute].
145. See Criminal Code, supra note 120 at s 724(3)(e); R v Gardiner, [1982] 2 SCR 368 at 26, 
140 DLR (3d) 612. 
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B. THE ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ACT
Th e EEA amends nine federal environmental statutes: the Antarctic Environ-
mental Protection Act;146 the Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act 
[CNMCAA]147 the Canada National Parks Act;148 the Canada Wildlife Act;149 the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA, 1999);150 the International River 
Improvements Act;151 the Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994;152 the Saguenay – 
St. Lawrence Marine Park Act;153 and the Wild Animal and Plant Protection and 
Regulation of International and Interprovincial Trade Act.154 All of these statutes 
contain provisions that prohibit harm either to a particular environment—such 
as a marine conservation area, national park, or international river—or caused by 
a particular activity, such as the handling and disposal of hazardous substances or 
the killing of or trading in wildlife. Th ey also contain other kinds of prohibitions, 
including those related to the fi ling of documents and records, which may not be 
directly related to any kind of environmental harm.155 
When all of the EEA’s provisions are proclaimed into force, each of the nine 
statutes will have essentially the same “purpose of sentencing” clause, tailored 
to the specifi c circumstances of each act. Th us, under the CNPA, the amending 
provisions of which have already been proclaimed into force,
[t]he fundamental purpose of sentencing for off ences under this Act is to contribute 
to respect for the law establishing and protecting parks through the imposition of just 
sanctions that have as their objectives
(a)   to deter the off ender and any other person from committing off ences under 
this Act;
146. SC 2003, c 20 [AEPA].
147. CNMCAA, supra note 43.
148. SC 2000, c 32 [CNPA].
149. RSC 1985, c W-9 [CWA].
150. Supra note 3.
151. RSC 1985, c I-20 [IRIA].
152. Supra note 5.
153. SC 1997, c 37 [SSLMPA].
154. SC 1992, c 52 [WAPPRIITA]. Th e EEA also creates the Environmental Violations 
Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, SC 2009, c 14, s 126 [EVAMPA]. Th is act establishes 
an administrative monetary penalty scheme applicable to the acts listed above, as well as to 
the Canada Water Act, RSC 1985, c C-11 [CWA].
155. See e.g. MBCA, supra note 5, s 5.2. Th e Act states: “No person shall (a) wilfully destroy or 
cause to be destroyed a document, a record or data that is required to be kept under this Act 
or the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, or wilfully alter or cause to be altered such a document, a 
record or data with intent to mislead.” 
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(b)   to denounce unlawful conduct that damages or creates a risk of damage to 
parks; and
(c)   to restore park resources.156
In addition to deterrence and respect for the regulatory process, both of 
which are already established objectives in sentencing, Canadian judges must 
now have regard to restoration. Although judges have been ordering restoration 
and remediation under the guise of “creative sentencing” for several years, these 
have not generally been regarded as objectives in sentencing.157 
Th rough this addition, Parliament can be considered as having confi rmed 
a “polluter pays” approach to sentencing. Already “firmly entrenched in 
environmental law in Canada,”158 the polluter pays principle “assigns polluters 
the responsibility for remedying contamination for which they are responsible 
and imposes on them the direct and immediate costs of pollution.”159 While the 
actual phrase need not be used in order for the principle to fi nd application,160 
it is not surprising that three of the statutes amended by the EEA explicitly refer 
to the polluter pays principle in the context of this new third objective. Under 
CEPA, 1999, for example, the objective is “to reinforce the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle by ensuring that off enders are held responsible for eff ective clean-up 
and environmental restoration.”161
To meet these purposes, Parliament has introduced new “principles of sentencing” 
into each of the nine statutes. Pursuant to subsection 13.1(1)(a) of the MBCA, for 
example, a court is directed to consider—in addition to the principles and factors 
set out in section 718 of the Criminal Code—the principle that the amount of the 
fi ne should be increased to account for and refl ect the gravity of the aggravating 
factors associated with the off ence, including those set out in subsection 13.1(2): 
(a)   the off ence caused damage or risk of damage to migratory birds or their nests; 
(b)   the off ence caused damage or risk of damage to any unique, rare, particularly 
important or vulnerable population of migratory birds; 
(c)   the damage caused by the off ence is extensive, persistent or irreparable162
156. CNPA, supra note 148, s 27.6 [emphasis added].
157. Hughes & Reynolds, supra note 121 at 111-12.
158. Imperial Oil Ltd v Quebec (Minister of the Environment), 2003 SCC 58 at para 23, 2 SCR 624. 
159. Ibid at para 24.
160. Jerry V DeMarco, “Building a Strong Foundation for Action: A Review of Twelve 
Fundamental Principles of Environmental and Resource Management Legislation” (2008) 
19:1 J Envtl L & Prac 59 at 64. 
161. CEPA, 1991, supra note 3, s 287(c). Similar wording is found in the AEPA: see supra note 
146, s 50.9. Under the MBCA, the objective is “to reinforce the ‘polluter pays’ principle and 
to restore migratory birds and their habitats.” See supra note 5, s 13.09(c). 
162. Ibid (subsection 13.2(d)-13.2(i) deal with intent, economic benefi t, prior warning, history of 
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As noted earlier, “damage” in this context includes loss of use and non-
use value.163
Like the purpose of sentencing clause, this list of aggravating factors serves 
primarily to codify the existing common law factors applied in sentencing,164 
with the new and important inclusion of use and non-use values in the defi nition 
of environmental damage. 
Part and parcel with these provisions are new minimum and higher maximum 
fi nes, diff erent levels of penalties for diff erent types of off enders, and Governor 
in Council authority to distinguish, using regulations, between less and more 
serious off ences that would carry lower and higher fi ne ranges, respectively.165 
For designated serious off ences by an individual, a summary conviction carries 
a minimum $5,000 and a maximum $300,000 fi ne, whereas on indictment the 
minimum is $15,000 and the maximum is $1 million. For small corporations, a 
summary conviction carries a minimum $25,000 and a maximum $2 million fi ne, 
whereas on indictment the minimum is $75,000 and the maximum is $4 million. 
For large corporations, a summary conviction carries a minimum $100,000 and 
a maximum $4 million fi ne, whereas on indictment the minimum is $500,000 
and the maximum is $6 million.166 
Parliament has also uniformly armed judges with the powers necessary to 
order what are often referred to as “creative sentences,”167 the most relevant of 
which would appear to be the power to order remediation. Th us, under the 
CNMCAA, courts may:
in addition to any punishment [fi ne] imposed … make an order … (b) directing the 
person to take any action that the court considers appropriate to remedy or avoid 
any damage to any marine conservation area resources that resulted or may result 
from the commission of the off ence.168 
Viewed this way, it might be presumed that Parliament intended for deterrence 
and denunciation to be accomplished through fi nes, with restoration and the 
polluter pays principle being achieved through additional orders such as re-
non-compliance and post-off ence conduct). Additionally, subsection 13.1(3) states that the 
absence of an aggravating factor is not to be construed as a mitigating factor. 
163. Ibid, s 13.1(4).
164. See also Hughes & Reynolds, supra note 121 at 110-11.
165. See e.g. CNMCAA, supra note 43, s 16(1)(n). Although the regulation-making authority 
here is not as clear as it could be, this power could be considered analogous to the distinction 
between Type A and Type B procedures under CERCLA. 
166. Parliamentary Information and Research Service, supra note 4 at 6.
167. Hughes & Reynolds, supra note 121.
168. CNMCAA, supra note 43, ss 27(1), 27(1)(b).
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mediation. Th is distinction seems to evaporate, however, in light of the EEA’s 
requirement that all fi nes be directed to Environment Canada’s Environmental 
Damages Fund (EDF).169 A sort of ‘Superfund-lite’ the EDF receives money from 
civil judgments and regulatory sentences, which it spends on environmental 
restoration in the location where the damage occurred or on other projects based 
on established criteria.170 In other words, the EDF “follows the Polluter Pays 
Principle to help ensure that those who cause environmental damage or harm to 
wildlife take responsibility for their actions.”171 
On their face, these EEA provisions may seem duplicative. As will be seen 
below, however, the power to order remediation and the allocation of all fi nes to 
the EDF (essentially an indirect remediation order) actually ensures a compre-
hensive scheme for capturing the full range of relevant ecosystem services losses, 
both permanent and temporary, actual and potential, and for ensuring that 
environmental fi nes are put to the best use. Th e only concern will be to avoid 
double counting, which could occur where the Crown introduces evidence of 
ecosystem service losses and also seeks an order for restoration. In such instances, 
the amount of the fi ne refl ecting actual ecosystem service losses (setting aside for 
the moment the risk of loss) would be restricted to interim losses, recognizing 
that restoration should eventually replace any permanent losses.172 On the other 
hand, in the majority of cases where the actual environmental damage and therefore 
restoration required is minimal173 but the risk of damage—the potential loss of 
ecosystem services—is great, both a restoration order and a signifi cant fi ne may 
be appropriate and would not constitute double counting. 
Th e availability of both restoration orders and the EDF also gives judges the 
option of retaining jurisdiction over restoration activities (e.g., where the conduct 
169. See CNPA, supra note 148, s 29.1(1); CNMCAA, supra note 43, s 26.1; IRIA, supra note 151, 
s 44; CWA, supra note 149, s 13.13; and MBCA, supra note 5, s 13.2.
170. Harry J Wruck, QC, “Th e Federal Environmental Damages Fund” (2004) 5 CELR (3d) 
120 at 120. See also Hughes & Reynolds, supra note 121; and Environment Canada, online: 
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/edf-fde/default.asp?lang=En&n=A82326FE-1> [EDF Website] (listing 
recent cases and corresponding fi nes). 
171. Ibid. 
172. Th e same approach was advanced in Canada, in Canfor, supra note 9 at para 11. Th e Court 
observed:
Th e Attorney General of Canada intervened in support of the Province to argue that full com-
pensation for damage to protected natural resources must include reimbursement for fi nancial 
expenditure on restoring the natural resource (“restoration cost”), compensation for the loss 
of use and passive use until such time as restoration is complete (“loss of use”), and, where the 
facts warrant, additional compensation for permanent loss of a unique resource where there is 
no prospect of restoration.
173. Wruck, supra note 170 at 137.
(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL160
of the accused was particularly off ensive) or allowing these to be managed by 
the EDF. In the latter case, the Crown would simply need to ensure that 
the fi ne requested is suffi  cient to secure adequate restoration. Such costs could 
be introduced as evidence of lost use and non-use values, bearing in mind that 
under the American NRDA legislation restoration costs are generally preferred 
as an indirect but more transparent method for valuing actual ecosystem services 
losses, while in Canada they have been recommended as the presumptive method 
for estimating environmental damages.174
1. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES-BASED EDA 
Before considering the opportunities and challenges for ecosystem services-
based EDA, it is reasonable to ask whether adoption of the ecosystem services 
paradigm—or any kind of valuation framework—is desirable for the purposes 
of environmental sentencing. After all, valuation does presume a utilitarian or 
instrumental view of the natural world seemingly to the exclusion of other values, 
including intrinsic value.175 
Whatever one’s position on the utilitarian versus intrinsic value debate with 
respect to environmental law and policy generally,176 in the specifi c context of 
the EEA the question appears moot. Parliament clearly signaled its approval for 
a utilitarian approach when it included use and non-use values in the defi nition 
of environmental damage. Furthermore, those who might insist on recognizing 
the environment’s intrinsic value can fi nd solace in the fact that the use of the 
non-exhaustive term “includes” in the defi nition of environmental damage leaves 
room for judges to take intrinsic value into account, should the Crown introduce 
evidence of it. 
174. See supra note 106-109. 
175. For the possible emergence of a non-utilitarian ethic in environmental law, see Demarco, 
supra note 160 at 67. According to Professors Karin Mickelson and William Rees, however, 
“there is no doubt that environmental protection is understood in instrumental terms … 
indeed, it can be said to characterize most current environmental law and policy.” See “Th e 
Environment: Ecological and Ethical Dimensions” in Elaine Hughes, Alastair R Lucas & 
William A Tilleman, Environmental Law and Policy, 3d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 
2003) 1 at 19. 
176. On the utilitarian side, there would also seem considerable merit in the position, fi rst 
articulated in Nature’s Services, that “economic markets play a dominant role in patterns of 
human behavior, and the expression of value—even if imperfect—in a common currency 
helps to inform the decision-making process.” See Daily, supra note 25 at 10. For intrinsic 
arguments, see e.g. Sagoff , supra note 30. 
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i. Judicial Capacity and the Role of Expert Evidence
Perhaps the most important determinant with respect to the potential for an ecosystem 
services approach to EDA is not the inclusion of use and non-use values in the 
defi nition of environmental damages but the Canadian judiciary’s established 
appreciation for, and understanding of, technical expert evidence with respect to 
environmental harm. 
There is little merit in the argument that an ecosystem services approach is 
too complex for the purposes of sentencing, as was argued by industry when a 
similar approach was proposed for sentencing in the United States in 1993.177 
Canadian judges have demonstrated a considerable capacity for understanding 
complex ecological principles and processes, often in the context of competing 
expert evidence.178 Th ey have understood and written with sophistication about 
the perils of acid rain,179 the impacts of chlorofl uorocarbons (CFCs) on the ozone 
layer (including the importance of cumulative eff ects)180 the biological persistence 
of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),181 the impacts of sediment on fi sh habitat,182 
and the fragility of the arctic environment,183 to name only a few examples. 
Where lawyers and courts have struggled, understandably, is with the quantifi -
cation of environmental harm in monetary terms, relying instead where possible 
on the principle of parity. In the absence of a standardized metric, however, there 
is no guarantee that the fi rst (or “benchmark”) sentence for a given off ence refl ects 
the actual or potential environmental harm that arose in the circumstances, 
rendering subsequent sentences essentially arbitrary (at least with respect to this 
aggravating factor). Because of its precedential nature, such an approach can 
also lead to relatively low fi nes that do not account for society’s rapidly evolving 
177. US, Environmental Protection Agency, An Advisory of the Illegal Competitive Advantage 
(ICA) Economic Benefi t (EB) Advisory Panel of the EPA Science Advisory Board (EPA-SAB-
ADV-05-003) (Washington, DC: US Environmental Protection Agency, 2005) [EPA, An 
Advisory] (for a recent reversal in this position). Under current US Sentencing Guidelines 
(USSG), for off ences involving fi sh, wildlife, and plants, judges may take into account the 
“market value” of lost fi sh and wildlife or, where no market exists, the costs of restitution, 
but are advised to not consider aesthetic values measured through such methods as CV (see 
USSG § 2Q2.1).
178. See e.g. R v Procter, 2008 BCSC 19, [2008] BCWLD 1575.
179. See e.g. United Keno Hills, supra note 7 at para 9.
180. R v Canadian Tire Corp, (2004) OTC 668 at paras 57-66, 96, 110, 9 CELR (3d) 248 (OSCJ)
181. R v Chem-Security (Alberta) Ltd, 1998 ABPC 96 at paras 13, 22, 233 AR 289. See also R v 
Sinclair (2009), 45 CELR (3d) 222 at para 107-08, CarswellOnt 4894 (WL Can) (OCJ).
182. Northwest Territories, supra note 130 at paras 81-94. See also R v Sutherland, 2010 ONSC 2240, 
51 CELR (3d) 163; and R v Brown and Brown, 2005 BCPC 517, [2006] BCWLD 656. 
183. R v Iqaluit (City), 2002 CanLII 53331 at para 8 (NU CJ).
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knowledge of and appreciation for the problem of environmental degradation. 
Indeed, part of the rationale for the EEA was “a growing understanding of the 
extent and severity of the damages that environmental off ences can cause, and a 
corresponding increase in the demand for more severe penalties and fi nes … .”184
Both the Carriere and Caseley decisions, on the other hand, indicate a 
willingness to consider a diff erent approach. Although the adoption of an ecosystem 
services framework would clearly require some capacity building on behalf of 
both lawyers and the judiciary, a strengthened capacity to implement environ-
mental law was another factor driving passage of the EEA: 
Th e need for the amendments proposed in the … [EEA] are [sic] clear. At the Global 
Judges Symposium held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002, where Canada’s 
Supreme Court was represented, the Johannesburg Principles on the Role of Law 
and Sustainable Development were adopted. Th e principles include the following 
statement: 
We are strongly of the view that there is an urgent need to strengthen the 
capacity of judges, prosecutors, legislators and all persons who play a critical 
role ... in the process of implementation, development and enforcement of 
environmental law ... especially through the judicial process ... . 185
Stanley Berger suggests:
Th e endorsement of these principles … [is] worth repeating in hearings involving 
the admissibility of evidence and sentencing before trial and appellate courts because 
the commitment made is not simply that of a group of academics; it was made by the 
judiciary on behalf of the judiciary.186
It should also be noted that in New South Wales, where the framework for 
environmental sentencing is essentially identical to Canada’s, the judiciary has 
184. Canada, Environment Canada, Backgrounder: Environmental Enforcement Bill, New Penalties 
and Sentencing Provisions, (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 2009), online: Environment 
Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=en&n=714D9AAE-1&news=20D9CEF0-
0991-4A6F-A12E-FC132BDF06CA> [Environment Canada].
185. House of Commons Debates, supra note 2 at 1823 (Mark Warawa). In the preamble to the 
Principles, the Members of the Judiciary emphasized “that the fragile state of the global 
environment requires the Judiciary as the guardian of the Rule of Law, to boldly and 
fearlessly implement and enforce applicable international and national laws… .” See 
Th e Johannesburg Principles on the Role of Law and Sustainable Development adopted at 
the Global Judges Symposium held in Johannesburg, South Africa on 18-20 August 2002, 
UNEP, (2002), online: UNEP <http://www.unep.org/law/symposium/Principles.htm> 
[Johannesburg Principles].
186. Stanley Berger, Th e Prosecution and Defence of Environmental Off ences, vol II (Aurora: Canada 
Law Book, 2009) at 7.9. 
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already come to recognize that what the Caseley court described as “intangible 
losses” are actually externalities—the public costs of environmental or ecosystem 
service degradation—which can and should be redressed in sentencing:
Where the commission of an off ence results in external costs (environmental, social 
or economic) being suff ered, these costs contribute to the objective harmfulness of 
the off ence … . Th e court may not be able, by its sentence, to capture all of the 
external costs … . Nevertheless, the court may properly be able to refl ect the external 
costs in its sentence and by that means, in part, bring back the external costs to the 
off ender.187
In the United States there was originally considerable opposition to any 
assessment of harm in the enforcement context, and current policies now focus 
almost exclusively on recapturing the economic benefi ts of non-compliance.188 
Th ere have nonetheless been calls recently to take environmental harm, and the 
loss of ecosystem services specifi cally, into account in at least some situations.189 
Th us, in addition to an established role for expert evidence with respect to environ-
mental harm in the regulatory context in Canada, there is also precedent in other 
common law jurisdictions for recognizing and accounting for the public costs of 
environmental degradation for the purposes of environmental sentencing. 
ii. Furthering the Polluter Pays Principle
As mentioned above, the polluter pays principle suggests that polluters should 
bear the costs of the pollution generated by their activities. Among the most 
“operationalized” environmental principles in Canada,190 it is also recognized at the 
international level, for example in Principle 16 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (of which Canada is a signatory): “National au-
187. BJ Preston, “Principled sentencing for environmental off ences – Part 2: Sentencing 
considerations and options” (2007) 31:3 Criminal Law Journal 142. 
188. Under the EEA, such benefi ts are intended to be captured through the imposition of an 
additional fi ne pursuant to section 24.3 of the CNMCAA. For example:
If a person is convicted of an off ence under this Act and the court is satisfi ed that, as a result 
of the commission of the off ence, the person acquired any property, benefi t or advantage, the 
court shall order the person to pay an additional fi ne in an amount equal to the court’s estima-
tion of the value of that property, benefi t or advantage. Th e additional fi ne may exceed the 
maximum amount of any fi ne that may otherwise be imposed under this Act. 
 See CNMCAA, supra note 43. 
189. EPA, An Advisory, supra note 177 at 2. See also David Markell, “Is Th ere A Possible Role For 
Regulatory Enforcement In Th e Eff ort To Value, Protect, And Restore Ecosystem Services?” 
(2007) 22:2 J Land Use & Envtl L 549 at 549. 
190. Demarco, supra note 160 at 64.
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thorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs 
and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the 
polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of pollution … .”191 
In the context of the EEA (and of environmental off ences generally), the 
polluter pays principle is only partially applicable in the sense that most environ-
mental laws authorize the externalization of some environmental harm as the 
cost of economic development.192 In this context, application of the polluter pays 
principle does not seem intended to capture the full range of externalities (i.e., 
ecosystem services losses) associated with an activity but more specifi cally those 
attributable to the commission of a particular off ence because they fall outside 
of the bargain struck between governments, the public, and industry in setting 
regulatory standards.193
Even in this partial application, however, there is “little practical signifi cance 
in the notion that the polluter must pay unless it can be established precisely for 
what he must pay and exactly how much it will cost him.”194 It is in this sense, as 
a conceptual framework for capturing and organizing environmental values that 
may not be immediately obvious, that an ecosystem services approach to EDA 
seems particularly appropriate: 
Simply listing the services derived from an ecosystem, using the best available 
ecological, social, and behavioral sciences, can help ensure appropriate recognition 
of the full range of potential ecological responses to a given policy and their eff ects 
on human well-being. It can also help make the analysis of the role of ecosystems 
more transparent and accessible.195 
A recent controversial proposal by Canadian pipeline company Enbridge 
Inc. provides a useful example. Enbridge proposes to construct two pipelines 
191. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UNEP, 1992, UN Doc E.73.II.A.14, 
(1992) at principle 16.
192. See Hughes & Reynolds, supra note 121 at 105-06. Th e authors write: “To the disappointment 
of many, environmental law does not have as its focus the end of all environmental harm. 
Rather, it is about achieving a balance between the socio-economic benefi ts of modern 
industrial and technological development, and the health and ecological costs that inevitably 
accompany such activities.” One of the most prominent federal exceptions to this rule would be 
section 5.1 of the MBCA, supra note 5. See Syncrude, supra note 19. 
193. For a concrete illustration of this bargain and its occasionally arbitrary results, see Carriere, 
supra note 132 at paras 42-43 (Justice Robinson acknowledges, and expresses some sympathy 
for, the accused’s comments that while he may be guilty of illegally taking 158 birds, a dam 
lawfully operated by the provincial government does far more damage to migratory birds). 
194. Michael Bowman, “Th e Defi nition and Valuation of Environmental Harm: An Overview” in 
Bowman & Boyle, supra note 76, 1 at 1. 
195. EPA, supra note 33 at 12. 
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running from Alberta to Kitimat, British Columbia, where it would also build 
a new marine terminal.196 Of the three proposed marine transportation routes, 
one would see oil tankers enter the Hecate Strait via Queen Charlotte Sound.197 
Queen Charlotte Sound, in turn, is adjacent to the Gwaii Haanas National Marine 
Conservation Area, Canada’s fi rst marine conservation area (MCA) under the 
CNMCAA.198 In light of the recent Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, 
which has also stirred memories of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, it is not 
surprising that many local First Nations have called for an outright ban on oil 
tanker traffi  c in this area, arguing that a spill would be just a matter of time.199 
Should a spill occur within Gwaii Haanas, it could easily constitute an 
off ence under the CNMCAA.200 Pursuant to subsection 24.7(2), a sentencing judge 
would need to consider whether “(a) the off ence caused damage or risk of damage 
to any marine conservation area resources,” whether this damage was to “(b) … 
any unique, rare, particularly important or vulnerable marine conservation area 
resources,” and whether it was “(c) … extensive, persistent or irreparable,” where 
“damage” includes the loss of use and non-use values.201 
A sentencing judge might be inclined, as Justice Robinson did in R v Carriere, 
to turn to the relevant legislative framework for “some understanding of what 
[MCAs] are worth.”202 As noted in Part I, most environmental laws—including 
those amended by the EEA—are replete with references to the more obvious 
196. Enbridge, Northern Gateway Pipelines, Project Brochure, vol 4 (Vancouver: Blanchette Press, 
2010) at 4. 
197. Ibid at 11. 
198. See online: Parks Canada <http://www.pc.gc.ca/progs/amnc-nmca/cnamnc-cnnmca/
gwaiihaanas/itm3-/estab3a_e.asp?all=true> [Parks Canada]. 
199. “Oil tanker traffi  c ban sought by B.C. groups,” CBC News (30 November 2010), online: 
CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/11/30/bc-groups-want-ban-on-oil-
tanker-traffi  c.html>. While catastrophic spills of that magnitude (nearly 11 million gallons in 
the case of the Exxon Valdez) are uncommon, oil spills do happen all over the world. Between 
1960 – 1995, there were nearly 1000 spills of at least 10,000 gallons (approximately 37,850 
liters) with the greatest number occurring in the Gulf of Mexico (267) and the northeastern 
United States. See online: NOAA <http://archive.orr.noaa.gov/faq_topic.php?faq_topic_
id=1#2>. In Canada, oil tankers have been fi ned between $80,000 and $125,000 for spills 
off  the coast of Nova Scotia. In fact, it was an oil spill that led to the creation of the EDF. See 
Wruck, supra note 170 at 131 and 120, respectively.
200. Supra note 43, s 29(1). 
201. Supra note 43. 
202. In that case, Justice Robinson referred to provisions of the 1916 Convention and those 
contained in an amending Protocol signed by the United States and Canada on 14 December 
1995 that signaled the Parties’ reasons for protecting migratory birds, found in a schedule to 
the MBCA. See Carriere, supra note 132 at paras 24-25. 
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ways in which humans benefi t from ecosystems. In the case of the CNMCAA, 
Parliament recognized that “the protection of natural, self-regulating marine 
ecosystems is important for the maintenance of biological diversity” and that 
“the marine environment is fundamental to the social, cultural and economic 
well-being of people living in coastal communities … .”203 
On their own, such statements say very little about the specifi c contributions 
made by marine environments, making a comprehensive assessment of lost use 
and non-use values diffi  cult. Applying the ecosystem services approach, however, 
these contributions can be, and have been, catalogued and listed as follows:
• Provisioning services: food (primarily fi sh), bulk raw materials, 
medicines, and ornamental resources;
• Regulating services: nutrient cycling and fertility, air quality and 
climate regulation, waste treatment, moderation of extreme events 
(e.g. storm protection); 
• Habitat Services: maintenance of life cycles (nursery); maintenance 
of genetic diversity;
• Amenity and Cultural Services: recreational services (e.g. eco-
tourism); inspiration for culture, art and design; and spiritual 
experience.204
A similar preliminary listing of services can be made with respect to 
national parks and rivers, as well as migratory birds and other wildlife.205 Such 
lists would then need to be revised and quantifi ed, applying the various tools 
discussed in Part I (e.g., travel cost method, CV, benefi t transfer) against the 
“hard data” found lacking in Caseley. In the case of the Gwaii Haanas, such data 
would include the following: 
• More than 370 thousand pairs of seabirds including tufted puffi  ns, 
rhinoceros auklets, ancient and marbled murrelets nest in Gwaii 
Haanas [habitat services];
203. Supra note 43 (preamble).
204. See e.g. supra note 53 at ch 18. See also Charles H Peterson & Jane Lubchenco, “Marine 
Ecosystem Services” in Daily, supra note 25, 177; and Les Kaufman & Paul Dayton, 
“Impacts of Marine Resource Extraction on Ecosystem Services and Sustainability” in Daily, 
supra note 25, 275.  
205. See Brauman et al, supra note 29 at 72 (with respect to rivers and their related services). With 
respect to migratory birds, see the discussion applying the TEEB typology to migratory birds 
in the Carriere case in Part II A, above.
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• Seventeen species of whales and dolphins including orcas, humpbacks 
and grey whales can be seen in the waters of Gwaii Haanas [habitat 
and cultural services];
• Th e waters of this MCA support the Haida’s traditional harvest of 
marine resources, as well as commercial fi sheries including herring 
roe-on-kelp (K’aaw), salmon, halibut, rockfi sh, geoduck clams, and 
red sea urchin [provisioning and cultural services];
• A large sea lion rookery is located at the southern tip of Gwaii Haanas 
at Cape St. James [habitat and cultural services];206
Bearing in mind that valuation is a matter best left to the experts, a recent 
study estimated the benefi ts of marine protected areas in the United Kingdom at 
£5.5 to £12.7 billion.207 Similarly (in terms of magnitude and bioregional attributes), 
lost non-use values resulting from the Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound 
were estimated at a minimum of $2.8 billion (US).208 While these fi gures would 
obviously need to be adjusted downward for all but the worst scenarios (e.g., 
using the benefi t transfer method), it is clear from the above fi gures that a spill 
even a fraction of that size could result in millions of dollars in lost provisioning, 
habitat, and cultural services.
Th us, in addition to furthering the polluter pays principle by ensuring the 
comprehensiveness of any EDA, an ecosystem services approach would also render 
sentencing more transparent and accessible, both of which should advance the 
additional and important goals of uniformity and parity.
iii. Assessing the Risk of Harm
Th e polluter pays principle is also only partially applicable in the sentencing 
context in that it is only relevant to the question of actual as opposed to potential 
environmental harm. Th e courts in Cotton Felts, United Keno Hill, and Kenaston 
Drilling all recognized, however, that in many instances the potential environmental 
harm, both in the specifi c circumstances of the off ence but also more generally with 
regard to the prohibited conduct, is just as relevant to the objective of deterrence 
(both specifi c and general209), if not more so. Such recognition is also refl ected in 
206. Parks Canada, supra note 198. 
207. See S Salman Hussain et al, “An ex ante ecological economic assessment of the benefi ts 
arising from marine protected areas designation in the UK” (2010) 69:4 Ecological Econ 828 
at 836-37. 
208. Richard T Carson et al, “Contingent Valuation and Lost Passive Use: Damages from the 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill” (2003) 25:3 Envtl & Resource Econ 257 at 278.
209. See Terroco, supra note 122 at para 53 (“A key component of sentences imposed for breaches 
(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL168
the EEA. Th is suggests an even broader role for ecosystem services assessment and 
valuation than in the civil liability context, where only actual losses are relevant.
As with actual harm, an ecosystem services approach to the risk of harm 
would render it more transparent, comprehensive, and objective. Its probabilistic 
nature also highlights the distinction, noted at the outset of this Part, between 
civil and regulatory liability. In the civil liability context, the goal of EDA (or 
NRDA in the United States) is compensation, and ecosystem services valuation 
is carried out to quantify the extent of loss as precisely as possible. In the 
sentencing context, where EDA is being carried out to quantify the gravity of the 
aggravating factor (in this case, the risk of damage) with a primary view towards 
deterrence, whether general or specifi c or both, judges would seem to have more 
fl exibility. Evidence with respect to the value of ecosystem goods and services 
associated with the area or conduct in question could then serve as a guidepost 
for the risk of harm, rather than as a strict determinant. 
Suppose, for example, that a corporation released a toxic substance contrary 
to section 95 of CEPA, 1999 in the vicinity of the Credit River, near Toronto, 
and the evidence showed that while the actual release was relatively limited, the 
accused’s conduct created a considerable risk of a much greater release. Suppose 
further that the Crown introduced expert evidence that the Credit River watershed 
provides more than $371 million in ecosystem services to area residents every 
year.210 A sentencing judge would then have an objective guidepost in assessing 
the risk of harm caused by the accused, bearing in mind several other factors, 
including the nature, location, and duration of the prohibited conduct and its 
potential to cause ecosystem service losses. 
As another example, this time with a view towards general deterrence, the 
Court in R v Carriere observed that while the illegal taking of 159 ducks had no 
signifi cant impact on the duck populations of either the Cumberland Marshes or 
North America as a whole,
[t]he sustained health of North America’s wild duck population depends on the 
co-operation of the governments and peoples of three diff erent countries-Canada, 
the U.S. and Mexico. Th at co-operation is not just restricted to the regulation of 
sport hunting, but regulation of sport hunting is key to maintaining duck populations. 
… If every hunter took the view that he could double his legal limit, the annual 
of environmental protection statutes should be specifi c and general deterrence”). See also R 
v Sapp, 2005 BCPC 166 at para 9, [2005] BCWLD 3945. “It must be recognized that even 
if there had been little or no actual harm … there would still have been harm done to the 
processes designed to regulate and generally manage the environment and natural resources” 
(ibid at para 16). 
210. Pembina Institute, supra note 144 at 1.
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duck hunt would potentially result in 30 million ducks killed. Perhaps the ducks 
could take this pressure for a short while. However, as the examples of the passenger 
pigeon and the whooping crane illustrate, sustained overhunting would likely lead 
to devastation. 
Of course, one person breaking the law will not necessarily cause everyone to fol-
low suit … [b]ut the potential exists for one person’s breaches to encourage an ever 
widening disregard for the rule of law.211
As noted above, Justice Robinson was “left to assume that ducks have a 
signifi cant value … without having any precise fi gure for what that value might 
be.”212 It is possible, however, to assess the economic value of particular species, 
as has been done recently for polar bears213 and Atlantic salmon.214 Th e value of 
the former was estimated at over $6 billion per year, primarily as a refl ection of 
non-use values. In the sentencing context, such fi gures can provide an objective 
benchmark against which the risk of harm can be measured.
iv. Th e Potential for Higher Fines
As the above examples suggest, an ecosystem services approach to environmental 
sentencing has the potential to increase—perhaps even signifi cantly—the size of 
the fi nes imposed by judges. It is relevant, then, that in passing the EEA, Parliament 
clearly intended environmental off ences to attract higher fi nes:
Current fi nes are too low to be eff ective deterrents. Furthermore, they do not 
adequately express society’s strong disapproval of environmental off ences. …
To put this in perspective, we need to consider that penalties for environmental of-
fences in the United States often reach millions of dollars. Bill C-16 would address 
this issue by providing guidance to the courts in appropriate fi nes for introducing 
minimum fi nes, requiring courts to consider aggravating factors and increasing most 
of the minimum and maximum fi nes [sic].215
211. Carriere, supra note 132 at paras 46-47.
212. Ibid at para 27.
213. “What is the price of a polar bear?” CBC News (17 December 2010), online: CBC News 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2010/12/17/pricing-polar-bears.html>. See 
Environment Canada, Evidence of the Socio-Economic Importance of Polar Bears for 
Canada by ÉcoRessources Consultants (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 2011) (fi nal report). 
214. Charlene MacKenzie, “Study tracks true value of salmon; Research Miramichi one of 
four rivers looked at to determine impact of fi shing industry,” Telegraph-Journal (20 June 
2011) A1, online: Telegraph-Journal <http://telegraphjournal.canadaeast.com/front/
article/1416596>.
215. House of Commons Debates, supra note 2 at 1823 (Mark Warawa). Th ese increases would seem 
to bring Canadian penalties within the same range as many American ones: see Markell, 
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All other things being equal, this means that an off ence that would have 
previously merited a $50,000 fi ne should be met with a higher fi ne, post-EEA. 
Of course, setting a fi ne is a multifaceted exercise and environmental damage 
(and the risk thereof ) is only one, albeit important, aggravating factor. But if one 
of the drivers motivating the higher fi ne regime was a growing understanding of 
the extent and severity of the damages that environmental off ences can cause,216 
then an ecosystem services approach—whose very reason for being is to reveal 
the numerous, often hidden ways in which ecosystems contribute to societal 
well-being—is especially well-suited for achieving such higher fi nes in a manner 
that is fair and, as noted by the EPA-SAB, transparent and accessible. 
Th e availability of higher fi nes should also change the cost-benefi t analysis 
with respect to the appropriateness of carrying out ecosystem services assessment 
and valuation. Th at the cost of valuation can deter parties from carrying it out is 
widely recognized, including in Canada.217 As discussed in Part I, this reality has 
led to the creation of several low-cost methods for assessing harm pursuant to 
CERCLA Type A procedures and as developed by several states. Such tools would 
be welcome for minor off ences in the Canadian regulatory context as well, but 
where the actual damage is signifi cant or where the evidence establishes a risk 
of signifi cant environmental damage, the costs of ecosystem services assessment 
and valuation might be off set by the potential for a higher fi ne. And while the 
EEA—in contrast to CERCLA—is silent with respect to the costs of assessment 
as a component of environmental damage, it seems to leave room for the Crown 
to seek a recommendation from the court that portions of any EDF-destined fi ne 
be used to reimburse the government for assessment costs already incurred.218 
Alternatively, bearing in mind the funding structure of the EDF,219 the Crown 
might be able to introduce a preliminary assessment of damages and a relatively 
comprehensive estimate of the costs of a more detailed assessment and restoration, 
which would then be available for those purposes through the EDF.220 
supra note 189 at 561. Markell writes: 
Under many of the signifi cant regulatory statutes, EPA can impose substantial penalties — up 
to $32,500 per day, per violation. … If the regulated party has committed three diff erent 
violations of the Clean Water Act for a month, the total maximum potential penalty increases 
to $2,925,000 ($975,000 x three). 
216. See Environment Canada, supra note 184.
217. See Elgie & Lintner, supra note 15 at 256-57.
218. See e.g. CNPA, supra note 148, s 29.1(2).
219. Th e EDF does not appear to distinguish between assessment costs and the costs of 
restoration: see EDF website, supra note 170 (under “Potential Applicants”).
220. But see Wruck, supra note 170 at 134. He observes, “An area where polluters have in the past 
been highly suspicious of government is in the fi eld of environmental research. One common 
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v. Th e Environmental Damages Fund 
Th e EDF directs funds, received as a result of fi nes, to projects that benefi t the 
environment in the geographic region where the original incident occurred. 
Although priority is given to restoration projects, other projects that “develop 
environmental damage assessment and restoration methods including techniques 
for the valuation of damage” are given equal consideration in cases where little or 
no actual damage has occurred.221 
Th e literature is replete with references to data limitations, especially with 
respect to baseline conditions.222 Professor David Markell argues that the use 
of Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) and other enforcement tools to 
fi ll these gaps would enable the EPA “to shift the burden of doing much of this 
ecosystem-benefi cial work to the regulated community. … Enforcement off ers 
an opportunity for environmental progress and new learning that, quite simply, 
is not likely to occur if it were dependent entirely on government resources and 
initiatives.”223
Th e direction of fi nes to the EDF—especially in those instances where there is 
little actual damage but the risk of ecosystem services losses warrants a signifi cant 
fi ne—presents a similar opportunity. Th is opportunity takes on additional 
signifi cance in light of the Canadian government’s commitment, included in 
its fi rst legislatively-mandated sustainable development strategy, to develop and 
apply models for ecosystem services valuation by 2015.224 In addition to facilitating 
the gathering of baseline data, such work could examine recent recommendations 
made in the United States regarding the development of “ecosystem service 
assessment endpoints” for the purposes of ecological risk assessment.225 ERA is 
a fundamental part of the remediation process under CERCLA for sites that are 
so contaminated that they qualify for Superfund moneys and can be remedi-
ated without awaiting a trial award. As noted in Part I, ecosystem services have 
been advanced as a “common currency” that could facilitate the integration of 
complaint is that the monies are often needlessly spent by government scientists attempting 
to engage in research for the purpose of pursuing their own pet projects.” 
221. EDF Website, supra note 170 (under “Potential Applicants”).
222. Markell, supra note 189 at 571-72. For a Canadian example, see Nature Conservancy of 
Canada, supra note 36 at 26. 
223. Markell, supra note 189 at 554.
224. Canada, Sustainable Development Offi  ce, Planning For A Sustainable Future: A Federal 
Sustainable Development Strategy For Canada (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 2010) at 55 
[Sustainable Development Offi  ce].
225. Munns Jr et al, supra note 33 at 502.
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ERA and damages assessment.226 Such research would be particularly relevant 
for certain departments, such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and 
Environment Canada, which often order remedial work through administrative 
powers prior to taking enforcement action.227 Qualifying research would also 
include further research into the various tools discussed in Part I (including HEA 
and benefi t transfer), as well as the emerging concept of ecological production 
function (EPF), which describes “the relationships between the structure and 
function of ecosystems, on the one hand, and the provision of various ecosystems 
services, on the other.”228 
2. CHALLENGES FACING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES-BASED EDA
Perhaps the most obvious objection to ecosystem services-based EDA is that neither 
the EEA nor any of the statutes that it amends make any reference to that term. 
Although such a reference would be welcome, its omission should not be viewed 
as excluding it. As a conceptual framework accompanied with a set of method-
ologies, ecosystem services-based EDA is merely the means by which lawyers and 
judges can accomplish the more important and legislatively determined end (i.e., 
the consideration of lost use and non-use values), considering that Parliament 
understandably expressed no view as to the manner by which this should be 
accomplished. It is also worth recalling that the regulations under CERCLA and 
OPA rely on the concept of ecosystem services notwithstanding the absence of 
this term from either statute, and further that these schemes represent the gold 
standard for natural resource damages assessment and valuation. 
Constitutional questions and the uncertain prospect of enforcement are 
more serious obstacles to ecosystem services-based EDA in Canada. 
i. Constitutionality
Th e EEA’s damage provisions are likely to be challenged on constitutional 
grounds as an encroachment on the provinces’ civil jurisdiction over property 
and civil rights.229 Such a challenge is unlikely to succeed. Th e analysis is complicated 
226. Ibid at 501.
227. Hughes & Reynolds, supra note 121 at 116.
228. EPA, supra note 33 at 30. Th e report also suggests that “[t]hese functions capture the 
biophysical relationships between ecological systems and the services they provide, as well 
as the inter-related processes and functions, such as sequestration, predation, and nutrient 
cycling” (ibid at 30). See also NRC Report, supra note 51 at 3. 
229. See R v Zelensky, [1978] 2 SCR 940, 86 DLR (3d) 179. See also House of Commons Debates, 
40th Parl, 2d Sess, No 31 (23 March 2009) at 1827 (David McGuinty). McGuinty stated: 
“Th e court may indeed order compensation and restoration payments. I believe there will 
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somewhat by the fact that the EEA’s environmental damage provisions are not 
part of a statutorily authorized compensation or civil liability scheme but rather 
are subsumed in a list of aggravating factors within a fi ne regime. Nevertheless, a 
future accused facing a large fi ne is likely to emphasize the civil liability character 
of these provisions and argue substance over form. Both CERCLA and the OPA 
are civil liability schemes, after all. 
Even if the EDA provisions are considered tantamount to an authorized 
compensation or civil liability scheme, they are unlikely to be found ultra vires. 
Subsection 42(3) of the federal Fisheries Act, discussed in Part II (which attaches 
liability for losses resulting from a deposit of deleterious substances), was challenged 
unsuccessfully on such grounds in Gagnier and Hope Point Fishing Company Ltd v 
Canadian Forest Products Ltd.230 Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
in General Motors of Canada Ltd v City National Leasing,231 the court applied the 
following three-part test: 
[F]irst, a determination of whether the impugned provision does encroach on provin-
cial powers; second, in a case like the present one, a determination of whether it is a 
valid part of a regulatory scheme; and third, if the scheme is valid, a determination 
of whether the impugned provision is “suffi  ciently integrated” with or “functionally 
related” to the scheme.232
Although a detailed exploration of this question is beyond the scope of this 
article, it seems clear that no serious challenge could be made to the damage 
provisions of those EEA-amended statutes that deal with federal lands, whether 
national parks or marine conservation areas. As for the others, the damage provisions 
of each statute are tailored to the attribute of the environment that is the subject 
of federal jurisdiction. For example, the relevant provisions of the MBCA are not 
concerned with the environment generally, but with the loss of use and non-use 
values associated with migratory birds and their nests.233 Such provisions seem 
be questions about constitutionality.” Readers should note that such a challenge would be 
to the EDA provisions of the EEA generally, and would not be specifi c to an ecosystem 
services approach.
230. (1990), 51 BCLR (2d) 218, 23 ACWS (3d) 1040 (BCSC) [Gagnier].
231. [1989] 1 SCR 641, 58 DLR (4th) 255 [General Motors].
232. Gagnier, supra note 230 at 225. Readers may be interested to know that Mr. Gagnier was 
ultimately unsuccessful in his action. Agreeing with defence council that “Mr. Gagnier … 
will lie when it is to his economic advantage to do so,” the Court felt “bound to disregard 
Mr. Gagnier’s evidence altogether insofar as it touches on his claim for damages. Without his 
evidence, the … claims for damages must fail.” See Gagnier v Canadian Forest Products Ltd, 
1991 CanLII 143 at 17-18 (BCSC). 
233. Supra note 5, s 13.1.
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suffi  ciently integrated and functionally related to the protection of migratory 
birds to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
ii. Enforcement and Implementation 
A greater uncertainty with respect to ecosystem services-based EDA, or any EDA 
for that matter, is the likelihood of implementation and enforcement. As noted 
by Professor David Boyd, “[o]n paper, Canada has many seemingly impressive 
environmental laws. In practice, key elements of these laws are rarely, if ever, 
implemented.”234 While this issue was raised by several MPs during the debate 
on the EEA, perhaps the clearest statement of the problem was made by Bloc 
Quebecois MP Bernard Bigras: 
It is all well and good to want to change the fi ne structure, but the current laws 
must be enforced. I have been a member of this House since 1997, and I have seen a 
number of environmental laws enacted in Canada… But the fact is that we lack the 
resources to enforce these acts. We can give offi  cers more power, but there are very 
few offi  cers on the ground to enforce the law. 235
Although EC, and its Atlantic region in particular, already have a recognized 
capacity to conduct EDA,236 they do not appear to have the same kind of insti-
tutional support as their American counterparts (e.g., the NOAA’s DARRP). Th e 
Conservative government’s 2008 budget allocated an additional $21 million to 
EC over two years for the implementation of the stricter enforcement regime that 
the EEA was expected to bring,237 but it will take several years before an increase 
in enforcement, if any, will be measurable. In the meantime, recent reports by the 
federal Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable Development and 
Ecojustice suggest an opposite trend.238 
III. CONCLUSION
Justice Binnie, writing for the majority in Canfor, observed that “[if ] justice is to be 
done to the environment, it will often fall to the Attorney General, invoking both 
234. David R Boyd, Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) at 237.
235. House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 2d Sess, No 33 (25 March 2009) at 1943 (Bernard Bigras).
236. Wruck, supra note 170 at 138.
237. Parliamentary Information and Research Service, supra note 4 at 35. 
238. See Canada, Offi  ce of the Auditor General of Canada, 2011 December Report of the 
Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development (Ottawa: Offi  ce of the Auditor 
General, 2011), online: Offi  ce of the Auditor General <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/
English/parl_cesd_201112_e_36027.html>.
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statutory and common law remedies, to protect the public interest.”239 Canfor was 
an example of the latter kind of remedy. While the Attorney General for British 
Columbia was ultimately unsuccessful, the Court’s decision was widely received 
as having increased the potential for the common law “to assist in the realization 
of the fundamental value of environmental protection.”240 
Environmental sentencing in the post-EEA world is an example of the former 
kind of remedy mentioned by Justice Binnie. Th e inclusion of lost use and non-use 
values within the defi nition of environmental damage should similarly be viewed 
as having increased the potential of federal environmental legislation to assist in 
achieving that same important goal. In order to realize this potential, however, 
any assessment of environmental damages, including potential damages, must 
be as comprehensive as possible and must not overlook the numerous, often 
hidden ways through which the environment, or natural capital, sustains 
human well-being and prosperity. Th is was and continues to be the impetus for 
ecosystem services research, which is why this article explored the potential for 
ecosystem services-based EDA. 
Th ere are several factors favoring the incorporation of an ecosystem services 
approach to EDA. Th ese include the Canadian judiciary’s existing approach to 
environmental sentencing (particularly the established role of expert evidence in 
determining harm), the incorporation of restoration and the polluter pays principle 
as objectives in sentencing, the recognized importance of the risk of harm in 
achieving deterrence, the higher fi ne regime, and fi nally, the fl exibility and 
effi  ciencies gained by directing fi nes to the EDF.
A useful fi rst step in this direction would be to begin gathering necessary 
baseline information. It should be relatively easy, for example, to assess and then 
update periodically the ecosystem services provided by Canada’s national parks 
and marine conservation areas. Th is information would undoubtedly be useful 
for some federal government departments independent of its potential future 
use in prosecuting off ences.241 As noted, it is also possible to assess the economic 
value of particular species. Once conducted, such assessments could be applied in 
multiple cases, instead of undertaking separate valuations in each case. Such eff orts 
could thus result in considerable cost savings, with implications for the cost-benefi t 
analysis of ecosystem services assessment and valuation discussed above. 
239. Canfor, supra note 9 at para 8.
240. Ibid at para 155.
241. One might reasonably assume that Parks Canada or DFO would be the principal parties 
interested in such valuation, which could then be provided to the Public Prosecution Service 
of Canada (PPSC).
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Ecosystem services may not be an environmental law and policy panacea, but 
a “[f ]ailure to refi ne our understanding of their value, and the consequent inability 
to account for tho se values … is unlikely to promote their conservation.”242 Th is 
sentiment, directed towards regulatory and market settings, seems equally 
applicable to environmental sentencing. Accounting for ecosystem services losses 
in this latter context would be an ambitious project, and would require a 
clear commitment on the part of both the federal government and the judiciary. 
As noted, however, Canada has already committed to developing and applying 
models for ecosystem services valuation243 and members of its judiciary have 
committed “to boldly and fearlessly implement and enforce” its environmental 
laws.244 Considering also that such an approach would facilitate the understanding, 
protection, and restoration of ecosystem services in other contexts,245 the case for 
ecosystem services in environmental sentencing is overwhelming.
242. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 24 at 31.
243. Sustainable Development Offi  ce, supra note 224.
244. Johannesburg Principles, supra note 185. 
245. Markell, supra note 189 at 572.
